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INTRODUCTION
Succession law, the law governing trusts and estates, is experiencing
an identity crisis. Similar to an individual going through a midlife crisis,
the laws of succession seem to be in search of a new purpose or meaning.
It seems odd that a legal discipline as old as private property succession
law would lack the continuity of some shared jurisprudential image. Yet,
despite its historical legacy, succession law appears to have neither a com-
plete descriptive theory (explaining what the law is) nor a complete nor-
mative theory (explaining what the law should be), hence the identity cri-
sis.
It may seem intuitive that before lawmakers impose a consequence on
property owners there should be a unifying normative basis for making the
imposition or preferring the selected consequences of the law, or both.
However, rule making in succession law seems to be implemented and
developed in an ad hoc manner. Although scholars and legislatures tend to
pay lip service to succession law's historical core goal of effectuating a
decedent's testamentary intent, this once-central value has been cast to the
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periphery of legal relevance. Accordingly, the policy goals of succession
laws are largely amorphous, with no consensus built around any particular
theory.' This patchwork nature of succession law, though, has proven to
be fertile ground for scholarship. Succession law has been the subject of
intensive analysis, debate, and exploration of different theories to justify
and advocate the evolution of succession law.
There is no better example of this identity crisis than the simmering
debate over the past few decades among scholars and state legislatures
concerning how the laws of succession should change to encapsulate more
fully the evolving notions of American families. Changing family struc-
tures2 and emerging reproductive technologies3 influence the definition of
"parentage" in law and society. These influences may undermine the tradi-
tional definition of a parent-child relationship-the presence or presump-
tion of a genetic link between two individuals. Recognition of child status
is of particular concern for succession law in determining distributions to
"children" for intestacy4 purposes and for the law of wills.s
To date, scholars have proffered myriad succession law rulemaking
theories to justify different and often competing social policies concerning
the parent-child relationship for property succession law purposes. Goals
that have been advanced are numerous, such as advancing social equity
and fairness for survivors, providing stability and financial support for
survivors, acknowledging reliance between individuals, facilitating recip-
rocity between individuals, rewarding meritorious behavior (or penalizing
undesirable behavior), implementing social norms, protecting the nuclear
family, serving societal interests, fostering family harmony, fulfilling ex-
pressive functions, advocating transformative functions, and so forth. Ba-
sically, succession law jurisprudence has become the theoretical amalga-
1. See Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search of Its Context, 73
FORDHAM L. REv. 1031, 1033-34 (2004) [hereinafter Hirsch, Default Rules] ("[S]cholars ... have
developed no general theories of inheritance defaults . . . .").
2. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000) (acknowledging this social change, the United
States Supreme Court stated that "[t]he demographic changes of the past century make it difficult to
speak of an average American family"); Tanya K. Hernindez, The Property of Death, 60 U. PITT. L.
REv. 971, 1004 (1999) ("Only one in four families conforms to the idea of the traditional nuclear
[family] . . . ."); Helene S. Shapo, Matters of Life and Death: Inheritance Consequences of Reproduc-
tive Technologies, 25 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1091, 1101-02 (1996) (indicating that the nuclear family is
not one which is heavily represented among families anymore and attributing the change to increases
in divorce, second marriages, and a greater social acceptance of cohabitation and single people raising
children); Maya Bell, 'Gayby Boom' Shows No Sign of Slowing; More Gays and Lesbians Than Ever
Are Becoming Parents, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 28, 2003, at Al (quoting April Martin as saying
that what was a "sizeable boom" in the 1990s has become a "groundswell"); Betsy Hammond, The
2000 Census: More Say "IDo" to Cohabitation, OREGONIAN, June 6, 2001, at Al (reporting that nine
percent of all couples declared themselves "unmarried partners").
3. Methods of causing pregnancy other than sexual intercourse.
4. Defined as the state or condition of dying without a valid will. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 840 (8th
ed. 2004).
5. Intestacy law's definition of parent-child status potentially affects the law of wills in construing
undefined terms such as "child," "children," "descendants," "heirs," etc. See infra part I.A.
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mation of granting and weighing preferential status and competing inter-
ests affecting the decedent, the survivors, and society.6
Recently, the Uniform Probate Code (UPC)7 drafters-members of the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (the Na-
tional Conference)-entered the debate concerning the definition of par-
ent-child relationships and passed a number of amendments (the 2008
UPC Amendments) focusing primarily on defining familial relationships'
within the burgeoning areas of artificial reproductive technology (ART)
and adoption. These revisions to the UPC may be construed in one of two
ways: first, these revisions simply add technical changes to reflect evolv-
ing science and technology. Second, the changes reflect a paradigmatic
shift in the UPC drafters' approach not only to defining the parent-child
relationship but also to reflecting cultural and social policies in succession
law default rules.' If the changes are indeed merely technical (i.e., in-
tended to qualify the most recent technological changes in reproduction to
fit within the UPC), then married, heterosexual couples are the intended
targets of the language changes, and the effects on gay couples or untradi-
tional families are nothing more than collateral consequences. On the other
hand, as some legal scholars have opined, the drafters of the UPC may
have aspired to use property succession default rules to change our social
norms-in theory, changing the rules governing property succession will
influence society's perceptions of the parent-child relationship and nontra-
ditional families."o Regardless of any articulated rationale, in light of this
6. Hirsch, Default Rules, supra note 1, at 1036.
7. The National Conference is in its 117th year and "provides states with non-partisan, well-
conceived and well-drafted legislation that brings clarity and stability to critical areas of state statutory
law." National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Amendments to Uniform Pro-
bate Code (2008), http://www.law.upenn.edulbll/archives/ulc/upc/2008amends.htm. The National
Conference, which is also known as the Uniform Law Commission, consists of "practicing lawyers,
judges, legislators and legislative staff and law professors, who have been appointed by state govern-
ments as well as the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands to research, draft
and promote enactment of uniform state laws in areas of state law where uniformity is desirable and
practical." Id.; see also Justice Michael J. Wilkins, Report from 7500 Feet, UTAH B.J. 40 (Sept./Oct.
2008) (describing a commissioner's experience at the July 2008 National Conference meeting in Big
Sky, Montana). In general, the UPC proposes a set of laws for both testacy and intestacy; states are
free to adopt the UPC's proposals as is, to adopt their own modified version of the UPC, or to reject
the UPC entirely and rely on the state's current probate system.
8. Interestingly, in 2008 the UPC did not revise its notions of family across the board. For example,
the drafters are conspicuously silent regarding the UPC's recognition of domestic partnerships in
addition to spousal relationships (even though partnerships are increasingly recognized by states for
both gay couples and unmarried heterosexual couples).
9. Even though the Comments to the 2008 changes imply that the UPC was merely updated to better
reflect technological changes in reproductive technology, reflect cultural norms, increase monetary
limits otherwise indexed to inflation, and clean up wording, a closer look at the amended language
may lead even the most astute lawyer to infer otherwise. See Lee-ford Tritt, Sperms and Estates: An
Unadulterated Functionally Based Approach to Parent-Child Property Succession, 62 SMU L. REV.
367, 407 (2009) [hereinafter Tritt, Sperms and Estates].
10. Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., Honor Thy Father and Mother?: How Intestacy Law Goes Too Far in
Protecting Parents, 37 SETON HALL L. REv. 171, 199-200 (2006) (discussing the Expressive Theory
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recent change, the 2008 UPC Amendments are sure to spark intense de-
bate regarding the appropriate use of default rules and the policy goals
governing succession law.
Fortuitously, the nature of the 2008 UPC Amendments provide an
ideal case study to explore the proper goals of succession law. First, the
drafters of the UPC were silent on the overall scope or intent of their pro-
posed changes." Second, the 2008 UPC Amendments affect both intestacy
laws and the law of wills. Third, the 2008 UPC Amendments affect both
types of default rules: "permissive rules," those rules that should govern
property succession unless the decedent opts out of the rules, and "gap
fillers," those rules that presume the intent of the decedent and distribute
his or her property when the decedent or testator is silent regarding prop-
erty dispersal preferences.
Using the 2008 UPC Amendments as a springboard for analysis, this
Article considers the proper role of succession law default rules. For in-
stance, what is the appropriateness in general of adapting succession laws
to advocate or advance particular societal norms? 2 Moreover, should de-
fault rules embrace a consequentialist perspective that attempts to secure a
particular policy preference?
Given the wealth of literature on private property succession law theo-
ries and goals, why do we need yet another analysis? Quite frankly, exist-
ing policy analyses suffer from two fatal deficiencies.
First, in developing a regulatory framework concerning the transfer of
private property upon the property owner's death, analysts typically em-
ploy a bottom-up approach-divining policy analysis from a rule specifi-
cally tailored to govern an isolated concern. These scholars seem to be
rationalizing policies to justify the end result-focusing on the conse-
quence rather than the policy. When evaluating rules set forth within suc-
cession law, these rules and their accompanying policy goals curiously do
not seem to be set in stone. Scholars and legislators seem to create rules in
search of a policy goal, rather than creating default rules based on a pre-
vailing policy goal regardless of the desired end result. For example, re-
ciprocity between committed partners is often touted as a policy goal of
succession law and is used as a rationale to justify probate law property
of intestacy law, where society can express its views of acceptable conduct by incentivizing or penaliz-
ing that conduct within intestacy laws-"[Slociety merely attempts to teach individuals how their
fellow citizens view particular relationships, statuses, or regimes.").
11. This silence could be construed as a political move on the Committee's part designed to avoid
controversy inherent in changing the definitions of the parent-child relationship within the context of
nontraditional families.
12. See, e.g., Andrew J. Cappel, Bringing Cultural Practice into Law: Ritual and Social Norms of
Jurisprudence, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 389, 475-76 (2003) (discussing the proper role of, and
difficulties of using, cultural norms in law more generally); Kris Bulcroft & Phyllis Johnson, A Cross-
National Study of the Laws of Succession and Inheritance: Implications for Family Dynamics, 2 J.L. &
FAM. STUD. 1, 4-7 (2000).
2010] 277
HeinOnline  -- 61 Ala. L. Rev. 277 2009-2010
Alabama Law Review
rights for same-sex couples.13 But should reciprocity really be an over-
arching policy goal of succession law, or is it merely a rationale dressed
up as a policy goal by advocates of same-sex property succession rights?
Second, succession law scholars have exhaustively debated the proper
goals of succession law through the lens of an arbitrary, meaningless, and
misguided organizational system-a system that distinguishes policy analy-
sis between the laws of intestacy and the law of wills, as if the categories
were discrete, disparate, and incongruent. These scholars suggest that be-
cause the decedent did not properly draft a will, different policy concerns
should be considered in drafting intestacy rules than those considered in
drafting rules that affect the construction of testamentary instruments. Be-
cause it is fallacious to assume that all individuals without wills have con-
sciously chosen the intestate distribution scheme, and because the defini-
tions in intestacy laws are routinely used by courts to construe will provi-
sions, the foundational principles of succession law should reign equally
supreme in both the testacy and intestacy contexts. These scholars and the
UPC ignore the historical, and more appurtenant, arena in property suc-
cession law in which societal and judicial interests may eclipse decedent's
intent. Rather than focusing on testacy and intestacy, this focus on the
interplay between decedent's intent and other competing policy interests is
more appropriately allocated to an analysis examining the differences in
policies underlying succession law's mandatory rules versus its default
rules.
To resolve succession law's identity crisis, this Article argues that suc-
cession law should return to its roots and refocus solely on fulfilling the
decedent's intent. The intent of the decedent, rather than a particular view
of society's normative policies, should prevail to control distribution of the
decedent's private property.14 Because of our longstanding beliefs in the
free alienation of private property," succession law must account for the
decedent's choice in how his or her property is distributed after death;
what an individual may choose to do with his property during life should
not be unduly restricted after his death." Moreover, the default rules that
13. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
14. The philosophical terrain of private property remains vast and varied, often undulating due to
ancillary philosophical commitments to other normative concerns regarding economic or social justice.
Defending a particular philosophical concept of private property rights that favors any of those ancil-
lary normative commitments lies well outside the possible scope of this Article. Instead, this Article is
limited to discussing the methodology in determining default and mandatory rules of private property
succession as property rights are currently conceived within the estate law regime of the United States.
15. See POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY §§ 3.14-.17 et seq. (Michael Wolf ed., Lexis Nexis 2008)
(1949) (discussing the evolution of English laws designed to produce freely alienable property begin-
ning in the twelfth to fifteenth centuries).
16. See generally Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68
IND. L.J. 1, 6-14 (1992) [hereinafter Hirsch & Wang, Dead Hand] (discussing the numerous theories
used to justify testamentary freedom).
[Vol. 61:2:273278
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govern succession law should correspond and be in line regardless of
whether the decedent dies intestate or testate. The decedent's intent should
control.
Therefore, in an attempt to resolve the identity crisis, this Article ar-
ticulates and defends a rich positive and normative framework for analyz-
ing and developing succession law default rules. In a departure from pre-
vious approaches, this framework attempts to analyze the issue from a
process-oriented, rather than a results-oriented, perspective. Accordingly,
succession law mandatory rules should only be imposed to protect the de-
cedent's dispositive wishes or if particular aspects of unregulated transfer
of private property at the property owner's death will have socially delete-
rious effects on members of society. Otherwise, this Article's normative
claim is that the only goal of succession law default rules should be to ef-
fectuate decedent's intent. 17
In arriving at this conclusion, Part I considers the default rules of tes-
tacy and intestacy, analyzes various policies proffered to justify these
rules, and proposes that succession law should return to its original mis-
sion of effectuating decedent's intent. Part II introduces the case study of
the 2008 UPC Amendments in a detailed description. Part III then ana-
lyzes whether the primary policy goal of testamentary intent and succes-
sion law's structural goals are effectuated by the 2008 UPC Amendments.
Part IV provides recommendations to states considering adoption of the
2008 UPC Amendments on an a la carte basis and also recommends lan-
guage for practitioners to avoid the new default rules, if adopted in the
practitioner's state. Finally, the Article concludes that the 2008 UPC
Amendments, though beneficial to a sliver of the emerging nontraditional
family demographic, are, in fact, hollow technical tweaks which fall short
of changes that would ultimately benefit all families, traditional and non-
traditional.
I. DEFAULT RULES IN SUCCESSION LAW
It seems self-evident that before lawmakers impose a consequence on
property owners, there should be a normative basis for making the imposi-
tion and preferring the consequences of the law. Therefore, a clear under-
standing of and consensus concerning the normative basis for making new
law must be understood in order to evaluate the merits of the law. To this
end, the new UPC Amendments serve as a fascinating case study because
the drafters are silent concerning the normative basis for the revisions.
17. It should be noted that this Article is not arguing that there are no limitations to the concepts of
private property ownership or testamentary freedom. Although restrictions to testamentary freedom
should be rare, limits may be (and are) warranted at times-but these regulations should be in the
arena of mandatory rules, not default rules.
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Thus, a substantive analysis of the potential effectiveness of the UPC
Amendments must begin with an elementary overview of the foundational
purpose and underlying principle of succession laws. In addition, the ex-
amination will inevitably consist of weighing and giving preference to
competing overarching jurisprudential theories used to justify the creation
of rules that should foster succession law's general purpose.
A. Foundational Purpose and Principle of the Laws of Succession
1. Generally
The purpose of the laws of succession is simple-in a private property
system, there must be a procedure to facilitate the transfer of an individ-
ual's private property upon death. The very existence of private property
thus perpetuates the need for the law of succession. As Professor R. Ely
stated in 1914, the laws of succession advance the "continuation of the
r6gime of private property as dominant in the social order."" Embedded
within this notion of private property and the orderly transfer thereof is the
principle that individuals have the freedom (or right) to control the dispo-
sition of their property during life and at death.19 American society has
long recognized the value inherent in protecting an individual's ability to
acquire and transfer private property.2o Testamentary freedom is derived
from this well-established property law right and is accordingly the gov-
erning principle underlying American succession law. 2 1 Just as individuals
18. This purpose was first espoused in 1 RICHARD T. ELY, PROPERTY AND CONTRACT IN THEIR
RELATIONS TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH 425 (1914), in a list format more or less. See John T.
Gaubatz, Notes Toward a Truly Modern Wills Act, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 497 (1977) (further expound-
ing on the policy goals of succession law).
19. The right of a property owner to direct the disposition of property upon her death is commonly
known as "testamentary freedom." Rationales for testamentary freedom vary, and many theories have
been proffered in support for the principle of this theory-some widely accepted, others controversial.
See e.g., Hirsch & Wang, Dead Hand, supra note 16, at 5-18 (discussing various arguments for
testamentary freedom); Lee-ford Tritt, Liberating Estates Law from the Constraints of Copyright, 38
RUTGERS L.J. 109, 115-39 (2006) [hereinafter Tritt, Copyright] (providing a detailed discussion on
the scope and limitations of testamentary freedom). The most fundamental rationale for testamentary
freedom is that, in a society based on the theory of private property, the freedom of testation might be
the least objectionable arrangement for dealing with property succession at the testator's death. See
Hirsch & Wang, Dead Hand, supra note 16, at 5. Others argue that robust testamentary freedom is
natural, creates happiness, promotes wealth accumulation, encourages industry, creativity and produc-
tivity, reinforces family ties, promotes responsibility, and allows the testator to adapt to the needs and
circumstances of his particular family. See Tritt, Copyright, supra at 117-30. Each rationale has its
proponents and skeptics, but the very breadth of jurisprudential and pragmatic justifications for testa-
mentary freedom is, in itself, a testament to why this concept is at the core of Anglo-American succes-
sion law.
20. See Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law of the Living, the Law of the Dead: Property, Succession,
and Society, 1966 WIs. L. REV. 340 (1966) (describing the history of testamentary freedom and the
disposition of private property in American law).
21. It is generally held that the overarching jurisprudential foundation of American estates law is
testamentary freedom. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
280 [Vol. 61:2:273
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have the right to accumulate, consume, and transfer personal property
during life, individuals generally are, and should be, free to control the
disposition of personal property at death.22 Thus, testamentary freedom
can be viewed simply as one stick in the bundle of rights referred to as
property rights.23
In addition, although the United States Constitution does not speak
specifically about testamentary freedom as a property right, a robust pub-
lic policy favoring testamentary freedom has been fostered in America.
For example, states' probate codes have placed very limited restrictions on
the testator's ability to transfer property (mainly, a surviving spouse's
elective share) ;24 Article III, Section 3 of the United States Constitution
prohibits corruption of blood; the vast majority of the states have abol-
ished the Rule in Shelley's Case;2s and there is a growing trend in the
United States of abolishing the Rule Against Perpetuities .26 These exam-
ples tend to demonstrate a strong public policy of favoring testamentary
freedom.
In the United States, there are generally three ways to implement the
disposition and transfer of private property at death: wills, will-
substitutes, 27 and intestacy statutes. 28 While wills, will-substitutes, and
§ 10.1 cmt. A (2003) ("The organizing principle of the American law of donative transfers is freedom
of disposition."); VALERIE J. VOLLMAR ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO TRUSTS & ESTATES 21 (Thom-
son West 2003) ("Perhaps the most fundamental principle reflected in the American law of wealth
transmission is freedom of testation . . . ."); LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON WILLS, TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 7 (3d ed. 2002) (stating
the proposition that testamentary "freedom has a strong cultural tradition in Anglo-American law.");
Ronald Chester, Inheritance in American Legal Thought, in INHERITANCE AND WEALTH IN AMERICA
23, 23-32 (Robert K. Miller, Jr. & Stephen J. McNamee eds., 1988); Lawrence M. Friedman, The
Law of Succession in Social Perspective, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY: ESSAYS AND
AMERICAN ASSEMBLY REPORT 9, 14 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977) ("It is often said that the
principle of freedom of testation dominates the law of the United States."); Tritt, Copyright, supra
note 19, at 111 ("Testamentary freedom . . . is the hallmark principle of estates law."). See also infra
Part I.A and accompanying notes for further discussion of testamentary freedom. However, some
scholars are skeptical concerning the actual deference paid to testamentary freedom in American es-
tates law because of potential biased results from postmortem will contests. See, e.g., Melanie B.
Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIz. L. REV. 235 (1996) (theorizing that courts
validate wills on the basis of whether the testator bequeathed his or her property to his or her biologi-
cal family members rather than to nonrelatives); see also Ray D. Madoff, Unmasking Undue Influ-
ence, 81 MINN. L. REV. 571 (1997) (arguing that the "undue influence doctrine denies freedom of
testation for people who deviate from judicially imposed testamentary norms."). In addition to undue
influence, some other legal doctrines potentially check testamentary freedom as well. See Joshua C.
Tate, Caregiving and the Case for Testamentary Freedom, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 129, 142-44
(2008).
22. Testamentary freedom extends the concept of absolute property ownership beyond the grave. See
Tate, supra note 21, at 148.
23. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987) (stating that the right to transmit wealth at death is a sepa-
rate, identifiable stick in the bundle of rights called property).
24. See, e.g., Tritt, Copyright, supra note 19, at 132.
25. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER, infra note 28, at 876.
26. See id. at 905-09.
27. Basically, a will-substitute is the functional equivalent of a will executed during life. For example,
revocable inter vivos trusts, contracts, life insurance, pension plans, and joint accounts are all will-
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intestacy statutes differ in a variety of ways, each provides a possible
means of implementing the principle of effectuating the decedent's intent.
2. Under the UPC
The National Conference drafted the first UPC in 196929 to create a
more uniform probate law among the states."o The UPC affects both intes-
tacy and the law of wills. 31 The principle of testamentary freedom has
been incorporated into the UPC as the fundamental purpose behind its
succession laws; this purpose is articulated in UPC section 1-102(b)(2):
"to discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in distribution of
his property." 3 2 The UPC has historically, and logically, attempted to fur-
ther testamentary freedom in both the law of wills and intestacy contexts.3
Given the interplay between the law of intestacy and the law of wills,
it would seem evident that the purpose, the principle, and the policy be-
hind the creation of statutory rules for testacy and intestacy would be simi-
lar. The policy goals of the law of intestacy should theoretically coincide
with the policy goals of the law of wills; each represents a different side of
the same coin-the law of succession.
substitutes.
28. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 62 (7th ed. 2005).
29. See supra note 7.
30. Lawrence H. Averill, Jr., An Eclectic History and Analysis of the 1990 Uniform Probate Code,
55 ALB. L. REv. 891, 896 (1992).
31. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE (2008), 8 U.L.A. 9 (1998) (stating the UPC "consolidat[es] and re-
vis[es] aspects of the law relating to wills and intestacy.").
32. Other stated purposes include simplifying and clarifying the law concerning the affairs of dece-
dents, missing persons, protected persons, minors, and incapacitated persons; promoting a speedy and
efficient liquidation and distribution system; facilitating use and enforcement of certain trusts; and
creating consistency and uniformity in the field of probate law among the several states. UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 1-102(b) (2008), 8 U.L.A. 26 (1998); see also National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws, Amendments to Uniform Probate Code (2008),
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/upc/ 2008amends.htm. Scholars argue that additional
policy goals promoted by the UPC include ensuring family members receive fair distributions of
decedent's property to prevent disputes, promoting the interests of society (especially protecting family
members who were financially dependent of decedent) and promoting the nuclear family. Marissa J.
Holob, Note, Respecting Commitment: A Proposal to Prevent Legal Barriers from Obstructing the
Effectuation of Intestate Goals, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 1492, 1499-1500 (2000) (arguing that intestate
laws have yet to fulfill their goals because domestic partners' rights have yet to be recognized); see
also Stephanie J. Willbanks, Parting is Such Sweet Sorrow, but Does it Have to Be so Complicated?
Transmission of Property at Death in Vermont, 29 VT. L. REv. 895, 901 (2005) (stating that the
UPC's "intestacy provisions are designed to establish a suitable estate plan for the typical person of
modest means, to reflect the probate intent of the average decedent, and to accommodate modern
family structures").
33. The National Conference looks at "prevailing patterns in valid wills as a guide" to fulfill this goal
of disposing of the decedent's property in a manner that the decedent would have done had the dece-
dent written a will. Holob, supra note 27, at 1499-1500; see also Linda Kelly Hill, Equal Protection
Misapplied: The Politics of Gender and Legitimacy and the Denial of Inheritance, 13 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 129, 129 (2006) (explaining that intestate laws aspire "to reflect the 'presumed desires'
of the decedent" by disposing of the decedent's property to family members "based on a priority
scheme designed to approximate the significance of familial relations").
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Some scholars, however, seem to suggest, ipse dixit, that other poli-
cies besides decedent's intent may prevail in the realm of intestacy (but,
nevertheless, extol the status of testamentary freedom in the realm of tes-
tacy). 34 These scholars artificially and illogically bifurcate succession ju-
risprudence between testate and intestate estates and opine that other poli-
cies can trump testamentary freedom for intestacy laws merely because the
decedent forfeited his or her rights by not executing a will. For instance,
Professor Gary notes that the "tension between testamentary freedom and
succession within the family does not exist when a decedent dies intestate
because the decedent has not exercised the available testamentary free-
dom." 35 Without a will, has the decedent forfeited, at least in part, his or
her rights to have the laws of succession reflect testamentary desires as
closely as possible? If a property owner dies without a will or drafted a
will that is invalid, can the state impose whatever distribution scheme it
deems appropriate?36
Interestingly, the drafters of the UPC originally included a policy
statement explaining that the driving force behind the intestacy portions of
the UPC was effectuating decedent's probable intent. 3 7 This policy state-
ment is consistent with the underlying purpose of the UPC. 38 However, the
1990 and 2008 versions of the UPC have conspicuously omitted this por-
tion of the general comment that indicates this goal of effectuating likely
testator intent. Instead, the intestacy portions of the pre-1990 UPC are
recast as having been designed "to provide suitable rules for the person of
modest means who relies on the estate plan provided by law." 3 9 The 1990
and 2008 changes to the UPC are then said to be "intended to further that
purpose, by . . . bringing [the various sections] into line with developing
public policy and family relationships."' It seems that the UPC is shifting
focus to the negative externalities that might impact third parties rather
than focusing on the property owner. Thus, the UPC now reflects the in-
fluence of legal scholarship suggesting that, particularly in the intestacy
context, these other policy considerations can usurp decedent's intent.
34. Indeed, even the UPC drafters themselves seem to have explicitly endorsed eliminating decedent's
intent as a policy goal of its intestacy statutes to make room for the extremely subjective policy of
making laws that reflect "developing public policy." See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
35. See Susan N. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws to Changing Families, 18 LAW & INEQ. 1, 10 (2000)
[hereinafter Adapting Intestacy Laws].
36. Hirsch, Default Rules, supra note 1, at 1043-44.
37. UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. II, pt. 1, cmt. (amended 2008), 8 U.L.A. 271 (1998) (pre-1990 ver-
sion of article II) ("The Code attempts to reflect the normal desire of the owner of wealth as to dispo-
sition of his property at death . . . .").
38. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
39. UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. II, pt. 1, cmt. (amended 2008), 8 U.L.A. 79 (1998).
40. UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. II, pt. 1, cmt. (Supp. 2009). Bringing the UPC's intestate rules into
line with "developing public policy" was added to the 1990 version of the UPC, while "and family
relationships" was added to the most recent 2008 UPC Amendments.
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This artificial and illogical bifurcation of policy by scholars and the
UPC is problematic. First, it ignores the notion that intestacy furthers tes-
tamentary intent by giving an individual the right not to execute a will but
still have his or her property pass to intended takers. Otherwise, the de-
fault rules of intestacy would have a harsh effect on many individuals. 4'
Many individuals may not have either adequate knowledge concerning the
laws of succession or the mental acumen to create a valid will. In states
that do not allow holographic wills, this becomes even more problematic.
In addition, allowing other policy considerations to usurp decedent's intent
in the intestacy context forces individuals to hire lawyers to draft wills,
which many individuals may not be able to afford. Denying the right to
testamentary freedom to those without proper knowledge or resources
seems draconian. Before adopting a system for intestacy laws that punishes
certain property owners merely for being uninformed, ill-advised, or eco-
nomically disadvantaged,42 more convincing justifications must be given.
Second, diminishing testamentary freedom for intestacy purposes ad-
versely affects testamentary freedom for testacy purposes because the two
structures are inextricably interconnected. Intestacy statutes are used for a
variety of purposes.43 For example, in the realm of class gifts" the UPC
states that the rules of construction for interpreting a class gift (and there-
fore a gift based upon a written instrument and not intestacy) are those
rules found in the intestacy section of the UPC." The elective share provi-
sion of the UPC46 allows the surviving spouse of a decedent who has been
disinherited to override the will and take a certain portion of the estate.
41. Mary L. Fellows et al., Public Attitudes About Property Distribution at Death and Intestate Suc-
cession Laws in the United States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 321, 323-24 [hereinafter Public
Attitudes About Property Distribution at Death] (" [U]nIess the statutory scheme invoked in the absence
of a will conforms to the likely wishes of a person who dies without having executed a valid will, it
creates a trap for the ignorant or misinformed.").
42. Hirsch, Default Rules, supra note 1, at 1046-52.
43. For example, the statute determines who will have standing to contest a decedent's will because
intestate heirs are interested parties if the will is invalid. In addition, courts have used the statutes as
ways to identify the "'natural objects of the legislator's bounty' in determining will contests alleging
undue influence." See Tritt, Sperms and Estates, supra note 9, at 380 (quoting Susan N. Gary, The
Parent-Child Relationship Under Intestacy Statutes, 32 U. MEM. L. REV. 643, 644 (2002)). Addition-
ally, intestacy laws are not necessarily sectioned off to the general realm of succession laws either. In
Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security, 760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002), the issue was whether
posthumously conceived children qualified for social security survivor benefits. Id. at 259-60. Because
of a state statute, the children had to be classified as children of the decedent according to the intestacy
laws of that state in order to be eligible for the benefits. Id. at 261.
44. It is relevant to note that class gifts are inherently creatures of dispositive documents such as
wills. For a detailed description of class gifts under the Uniform Probate Code, see infra Part II.B.2.
Dispositive documents are also affected by intestacy statutes in determining antilapse rules and other
construction instruments. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-703 (2008), 8 U.L.A. 186 (1998).
45. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-705, cmt. (amended 2008), 8 U.L.A. 188 (1998) (Purpose and
Scope of Revisions) ("[This section] invokes the rules pertaining to intestate succession as rules of
construction for interpreting terms of relationship in private instruments.").
46. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (2008), 8 U.L.A. 102 (1998).
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The same term, "surviving spouse," is used in both the elective share pro-
vision of the testacy portion of the UPC as well as the spousal share provi-
sion of the intestacy portion of the UPC. Therefore, those not included in
the definition of "surviving spouse"47 are potentially affected by this re-
strictive term even if the property owner opts out of intestacy by drafting a
will. It seems counterintuitive that the underlying principle of estates law
would be diminished in intestacy if intestacy statutes influence the con-
struction and interpretation of wills. Therefore, a property owner could
opt out of the intestacy statutes of the UPC by drafting a will yet her will
would, nonetheless, be subject to the definitions under the intestacy stat-
utes. There exists the very real possibility that a definition found in intes-
tacy statutes will affect the testator's intended bequests. Thus, it is clear
that intestacy laws are not merely confined to the intestacy portions of the
UPC and do indeed affect parts of the testacy laws.
Despite all of the various theories and policy statements, the heart of
this matter is quite simple: there is no justifiable reason why decedent's
intent matters any less because the decedent died without a will or with an
invalid will. To state it differently, if the proposed purposes of intestacy
laws-promotion of the family, advancing society's interests, expressing
society's attitudes, etc. 4 8-are important enough to override decedent's
intent in intestacy, there is no reason why these same interests should not
override decedent's intent in a testate setting. Therefore, for purposes of
this Article, the artificial bifurcation of policy reasons based upon whether
property will be distributed through a will or intestacy will be ignored in
order to advocate a unifying principle of succession law.
For the foregoing reasons, the differentiation these scholars and the
UPC draw alleging divergent policies behind testacy law and intestacy law
is grossly misguided. Because it is fallacious to assume that all individuals
without wills have consciously chosen the intestate distribution scheme and
because the definitions in intestacy laws are routinely used by courts to
construe will provisions, the principle of decedent's intent should reign
equally supreme in both the testacy and intestacy contexts. These scholars
and the UPC ignore the historical, and more appurtenant, arena in prop-
erty succession law where societal and judicial interests may trump the
decedent's intent. Rather than focusing on testacy and intestacy, this focus
on the interplay between decedent's intent and other competing policy in-
terests is more appropriately allocated to an analysis examining the differ-
ences in policies underlying succession law's mandatory rules versus its
default rules.49
47. This would seem to include both same-sex couples and unmarried opposite-sex couples.
48. See supra Part I.A.1.
49. See infra Part I.B.
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B. Creating Statutory Rules
Having dispensed with the artificial policy bifurcation between testacy
and intestacy as inapposite, this Article now turns its focus to the pertinent
policy distinction-the distinction between mandatory rules and default
rules. Similar to other legal disciplines, succession laws can be divided
into these two distinct classes. The smaller group, the mandatory rules,
consists of those rules that individuals must obey, irrespective of his or her
wishes.so The Rule Against Perpetuities and will formality statutes serve as
examples. The larger group, default rules, encompasses rules that are
changeable and are only applicable to individuals who forbear to take
whatever steps the law requires to override them.' The intestacy statutes,
with their comprehensive implications on distribution and potential to af-
fect every decedent, are the most prevalent and recognizable of the default
rules.5
In succession law, mandatory rules should only be imposed if society
finds an overwhelming need to protect (i) a decedent in effectuating his or
her testamentary intent or (ii) an individual who would be excluded from
taking if the state were to directly implement the decedent's testamentary
intent. In either case, mandatory rules are paternalistic in nature. In the
former case, mandatory rules foster and protect testator's intent and there-
fore should only be used if unregulated death-time transfers of property
would undermine a decedent's wishes." In the latter case, however, man-
datory rules impinge upon and displace the principle of testamentary free-
dom. Therefore, these types of mandatory rules should be implemented
only if particular aspects of unregulated transfers of death have a socially
deleterious effect on members of society excluded from the decedent's
wishes.54 Thus, in creating these mandatory rules, the issue is whether the
particular paternalistic concern is sufficiently great to justify the use of
mandatory rules to impede the property rights associated with testamentary
freedom.
50. Hirsch, Default Rules, supra note 1, at 1032; Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in In-
complete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989); see Alan
Schwartz, The Default Rule Paradigm and the Limits of Contract Law, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 389,
390-92 (1994).
51. Hirsch, Default Rules, supra note 1, at 1032. In fact, the vast amount of succession law consists
of default rules.
52. It could be argued that the intestacy statutes are not default rules for some individuals; if these
individuals cannot afford the luxury of creating, or do not have the means to create, a will the intes-
tacy statutes transform into mandatory rules.
53. For example, the formalities associated with execution of a valid will are mandatory rules in-
tended to protect the testator. Requiring that two witnesses must watch the testator sign the will helps
to safeguard the testator from executing a will under undue influence or duress.
54. Statutes that provide an elective share for spouses or mandatory support for minor children are
examples of mandatory rules. These rules are applied when the state has a compelling interest in the
outcome of the estate that outweighs the presumed status quo of testamentary freedom.
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Because the vast majority of succession statutes are default rules, this
Article concentrates its focus away from mandatory rules and toward de-
fining and evaluating the competing default rule theories. When the pre-
conditions of mandatory rules are not present, the normative legal analysis
devolves to the choice of default rules. There is considerable conflict,
however, among scholars concerning how to choose between possible de-
fault rules. Some theories advocated are testamentary intent, majoritarian,
normative, transformative, and penalty defaults. 5
Succession law default rules can be further divided into the subcatego-
ries of gap-fillers and permissive rules." Succession law gap-fillers pro-
vide courts with instructions on how to interpret or construe a testamen-
tary instrument when the instrument is silent, unclear, or ambiguous. For
instance, if a will is silent in defining the term "heirs," default rules will
fill in the gap and define the term. In contrast, succession law permissive
rules are binding on an individual unless the individual expressly opts out
from terms provided by the rule. For instance, the distribution scheme
provided by the intestacy statute may be binding upon a decedent's probate
assets unless the decedent creates a will; mere drafting and execution of a
will allows the individual to avoid the permissive rules altogether.
Because the new UPC statutes concerning a parent-child relationship
are default rules, this Article will focus on evaluating the various policies
that have been advanced to justify the development of succession law de-
fault rules. Note that another reason why the UPC statute makes a great
case study is that the parent-child relationship statutes serve both as gap-
fillers and permissive rules. Because, in succession law, gap fillers and
permissive rules are interconnected, the theory behind them should be
consistent.
C. Theories of Succession Law Default Rules
Succession law has neither a complete descriptive theory, explaining
what the law is, nor a complete normative theory, explaining what the law
should be. The policy goals of succession laws are largely amorphous,
with no consensus built around any particular theory." Despite the simple
purpose behind the creation of succession laws in general-the orderly
transfer of property at death-an encompassing, descriptive theory for the
55. See infra Part I.C.
56. Tamar Frankel, What Default Rules Teach Us About Corporations; What Understanding Corpora-
tions Teaches Us About Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 697, 702 (2006).
57. For example, if the testator does not define the parent-child relationship in his will, the UPC
relies upon its intestacy definition of "child" within the parent-child relationship to define children for
class gifts purposes.
58. Frankel, supra note 56, at 702.
59. See Hirsch, Default Rules, supra note 1, at 1033-34 ("[S]cholars . . . have developed no general
theories of inheritance defaults . . ).
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creation of succession law as a whole is lacking. To date, scholarship has
focused on analyzing specific laws within succession law, either advocat-
ing or criticizing the specific law based on various, and oftentimes, com-
peting policy grounds. Before an examination and determination of which
potential overarching theory should be used to guide the creation of suc-
cession law, a brief discussion of the applicable types of succession law
default rule theories is in order.
1. Intent Effectuating Defaults
It is generally agreed upon that the primary reason for succession laws
is fulfilling the decedent's intent.' Because of the historic, rich, and ro-
bust public policy of effectuating testator's intent in the United States, 6'
this seems like a strong cornerstone to base the default rules of succession
law. This is a natural and logical extension of the uncontroversial notion
that one has the right to acquire and freely transfer his private property.62
As one author has noted, "[c]onnected to the idea that individuals can own
and control property, separate and apart from ownership by the family unit
or other social unit, is the idea that an individual property owner should be
able to control the disposition of the property at his or her death."63 There-
fore, in order to effectuate the articulated rationale, the generally accepted
principle is that succession law should reflect the desires of the property
owner "both with regard to protecting expressions of desire and anticipat-
ing situations where those expressions are inadequately presented."'
Of course, an intent effectuating default regime might not be desired.
Protecting the intent of a deceased testator over the interest of living indi-
viduals rarely fares well when viewed from an ex post perspective. What
sense does it make for society to allow the wishes of the deceased to trump
the happiness of the living?
60. See, e.g., Susan N. Gary, We Are Family: The Definition of Parent and Child for Succession
Purposes, 34 ACTEC J. 171, 171 (2008) [hereinafter We Are Family] ("Drafters of intestacy statutes
have considered decedent's intent an important, perhaps the most important, factor in creating patterns
of intestate distribution.") (emphasis added); Hirsch, Default Rules, supra note 1, at 1042 ("[Tlhe
intent of the testator is 'the pole-star by which the courts must steer.'") (quoting 4 JAMES KENT,
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 537 (photo. reprint 1971) (1826-1830)); Tritt, Copyright, supra
note 19, at 111 ("Testamentary freedom . . . is the hallmark principle of estates law."); E. Gary
Spitko, The Expressive Function of Succession Law and the Merits of Non-Marital Inclusion, 41 ARiz.
L. REv. 1063, 1068 (1999) [hereinafter Expressive Function] ("Succession law generally places dona-
tive freedom at the apex of its hierarchy of values.").
61. See supra Part I.A.1 and corresponding footnotes.
62. See Tritt, Sperms and Estates, supra note 9, at 375 ("Just as individuals have the right to accurnu-
late, consume, and transfer personal property during life, individuals generally are, and should be,
free to control the disposition of personal property at death."); see also text accompanying supra note
15.
63. See Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws, supra note 35, at 9.
64. Averill, supra note 30, at 912.
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Even if desired, implementing a scheme in which the decedent's intent
is always effectuated could prove to be complicated and, at times, diffi-
cult. The goal is relatively simple in testacy because there is a written in-
strument to decipher the decedent's intent.' However, this goal is compli-
cated significantly by the lack of the decedent's express testamentary
wishes in the realm of intestacy. Decedent's intent is much more difficult
to fulfill in the realm of intestacy than testacy because in the former, there
is either no expressed testamentary scheme or one that the law deems in-
adequate for whatever reason." Therefore, it has been generally accepted
that the law should reflect the testamentary wishes of the average or typi-
cal decedent." However, the UPC has not created a single monolithic av-
erage testator. Quite the contrary, the UPC has created various contingen-
cies based upon what decedents from multiple types of backgrounds would
desire." Therefore, the "average" or "typical" decedent should be viewed
as a general and expansive term rather than a specific and restrictive
term.
Regardless, creating a more expansive view of an average decedent
would almost certainly increase administrative costs and, therefore, lower
efficiency to create a default rule scheme which is flexible enough and
inclusive enough to prioritize effectuating decedent's intent." Addition-
ally, it is unclear exactly how an intent-effectuating default rule scheme
would look. A few possibilities are: abandoning default rules all together
and switching over to a pure judicial discretion system; replacing default
rules with default standards, which would be rebuttable and without the
65. There are, however, still possible issues of ambiguous language within the will and intended
bequests to individuals who predeceased the decedent as well as the issue of wills which are, for one
reason or another, not valid.
66. See Tritt, Sperms and Estates, supra note 9, at 379-80. The default rule of intestacy under the
UPC breaks down further into two areas: pure intestacy laws in which there is no written instrument,
usually a will, indicating the testator's expressed intent; and the intestacy statutes that operate more
like "gap-filler" defaults in which the decedent has drafted an instrument but neglects, or chooses not,
to override the state-supplied law (e.g., it is incomplete, it uses ambiguous terms, or the intended
beneficiary has predeceased the decedent).
67. See Averill, supra note 30, at 912 (discussing the "generally accepted polic[y]" that "succession
law should reflect the desires of the 'typical person'"); Spitko, Expressive Function, supra note 60, at
1068.
68. See Spitko, Expressive Function, supra note 60, at 1077-80. "[The UPC's] intestacy provisions
do not purport to reflect the presumed intent of one typical intestate decedent. Rather, the provisions
purport to reflect the presumed intents of many, indeed thirteen, typical intestate decedents who died
in a variety of family circumstances." Id. at 1078.
69. In other words, the notion of a typical decedent should be viewed as one that can, and indeed
should, mean multiple things to multiple people depending on the circumstances of the decedent.
70. See Hirsch, Default Rules, supra note 1, at 1068 (finding that default "rules" are far less risky
than default "standards" and most people typically tend to be risk averse). Of course, if succession law
default rules stray too far from testator's intent, efficiency would be compromised as well as individu-
als spending time and resources hiring attorneys to draft around the default rules. For a general discus-
sion of efficiency in the context of corporate fiduciary obligations, see also Michael R. Siebecker,
Trust & Transparency: Promoting Efficient Corporate Disclosure Through Fiduciary-Based Discourse,
87 WASH. U. LAw REV. 115, 161-89 (2009).
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binding and rigid force of default rules; or creating an extremely compli-
cated set of default rules which attempt to account for every possible tes-
tamentary scheme. Some states have already begun experimenting with
allowing some level of judicial discretion in the application of default
rules."
If, however, decedent's intent is the most important goal in shaping
default rules, then increases in administrative costs and complexity will
simply have to be accepted as the inevitable bedfellows of a succession
system in which decedent's intent takes its rightful place on top of the pile
of competing policy goals. In addition, effectuating testator's intent leads
to the correct result. Intent effectuating default will provide flexibility to
encapsulate the changing nature of the American family and further vari-
ous economical and societal values72
2. Majoritarian Defaults
Majoritarian default theory applies an economic theory originating in
contract law to succession laws." The theory places equal importance on
default rules reflecting first, what a majority of decedents would want and
second, being simple enough so that the maximum number of people can
understand what they mean in order to opt out of drafting a will and
thereby saving money.74 Majoritarian defaults do not simply attempt to
create defaults that incorporate what the most number of decedents possi-
ble would want." According to the theory, there will come a point where
the default rules, in an attempt to account for as many circumstances and
scenarios possible, will lose their economic efficiency because they will
become both too complex for individuals to understand while they are
alive (when deciding whether or not to draft a will) and too difficult for
courts to administer due to their complexity.
71. See Hirsch, Default Rules, supra note 1, at 1065 n. 137 (listing state probate codes that allow for
judicial discretion to some level).
72. See supra note 19.
73. For a detailed discussion of majoritarian defaults, see Hirsch, Default Rules, supra note 1, at
1039-42; John Ferejohn & Barry Friedman, Toward a Political Theory of Constitutional Default
Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 825, 840 (2006) ("In contract, the early position on default rules was
that courts ought to adopt a rule that a majority of contracting parties would favor."); Eric A. Posner,
Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829,
839 (2003) (discussing majoritarian default theory in contract law).
74. See Hirsch, Default Rules, supra note 1, at 1039-42.
75. See Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., Honor Thy Father and Mother?: How Intestacy Law Goes Too Far in
Protecting Parents, 37 SETON HALL L. REv. 171, 213 (2006).
76. See Hirsch, Default Rules, supra note 1, at 1040 ("It follows that the wider the variety of alterna-
tive preferences that a default rule must anticipate, the fewer the number of parties who can take
advantage of it to save transaction costs. 'Plurality defaults' afford less savings than 'majoritarian
defaults,' . . . ).
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There are flaws in the majoritarian default theory in succession laws
that do not appear in the realm of contract law." There is also a danger in
the expressed willingness to ignore a minority of decedents' intent merely
because some sort of majority has been attained with questionable eco-
nomic benefit."
Another flaw in majoritarian default theory is raised by the simple
question of "which majority?". If one were to take the succession law
pulse of various individual states and compare them, it is very likely that
the results constituting a majority for majoritarian default rule purposes
would differ. Indeed, it is also likely that these results would vary with a
national majority.o What about an international majority?"' Ultimately,
majoritarian default theory, like other default rule theories, is willing to
buck decedent's intent for another purpose; in this case it just happens to
be economic efficiency.
3. Normative Defaults
Normative defaults in succession laws attempt to provide "for the
well-being of society"" and are an amalgamation" of the public policy
goals toward which succession laws should strive.' As one scholar has
noted, "[tihe most fundamental change in American law ... is the grow-
ing reliance on legislation to solve social and economic problems."" Ulti-
mately, the intent of the dead does not weigh heavily in a utilitarian calcu-
77. For example, majoritarian defaults may not be very efficient at all since once a testator has hired
a lawyer to draft a will, the lawyer will have to decipher the testator's intent. Additionally, it is poten-
tially dangerous for testators to draft an imperfect will and rely on gap-fillers because there is no
uniform set of gap-fillers in the law of succession. Should the testator move to another state or should
the gap-fillers change for the testator's current unchanged location, the testator runs the risk of por-
tions of his will changing unilaterally. This means that the testator would have to revise his will each
time he moves or each time the gap-filler laws change. This certainly does not represent an economic
efficiency. See Hirsch, Default Rules, supra note 1, at 1039-40.
78. Ferejohn & Friedman, supra note 73, at 834 ("As attractive as [a] majority rule might be as a
decision procedure, there is nothing stopping a majority from taking advantage of a minority.").
79. See id. at 842 (finding that, in a discussion of majoritarian default rules in the area of constitu-
tional law, "[t]he Supreme Court often adopts an intriguing tradeoff between federalist and nationalist
values . . . .").
80. This is, of course, to say nothing of the problem presented by pluralities.
81. A discussion of the succession laws of various countries is beyond the scope of this Article. Suf-
fice it to say, however, that an international majority would certainly differ somewhat from a U.S. or
state majority. See Ferejohn & Friedman, supra note 73, at 844 ("Particularly contentious at the
moment is jurisprudence suggesting that the relevant majority on some issues includes international
consensus.").
82. See Gaubatz, supra note 18, at 501.
83. See Hirsch, Default Rules, supra note 1, at 1036 ("It would seem, then, that intestacy law ...
has become a theoretical grab-bag.").
84. For a detailed discussion of normative defaults, see Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws, supra note
35.
85. See Mary Louise Fellows, Concealing Legislative Reform in the Common-Law Tradition: The
Advancements Doctrine and the Uniform Probate Code, 37 VAND. L. REv. 671, 671 (1984).
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lus16 (unless, of course, it is an individual's self-concern about the costs
they specifically might incur in securing their desired testamentary
wishes).
The most dominant goal of normative defaults is protecting the fam-
ily." While this is a noble goal, it is unclear why it should exist primarily
in the realm of default rules." If protecting the family is important enough
to warrant upending an intestate decedent's likely intent via normative
default rules, then the rules should become mandatory rules that a testator
cannot draft around.
Another goal of normative defaults that has been advanced is the pro-
motion of reciprocity, i.e., that default rules should reward caretaking
behavior on the part of the survivors." The reciprocity purpose of default
rules is somewhat apparent in the elective share provisions of the UPC.
The elective share (or forced share) allows a marital spouse who was dis-
inherited from a will to take a specified portion of the estate notwithstand-
ing the decedent's clearly stated intent." The original justification for the
elective share provision in the UPC was to provide support for the poten-
tially disinherited spouse. 9' However, recent commentary to the elective
share section of the UPC suggests that it has adopted, at least in part, a
reciprocity rationale.'
Closely related to reciprocity is a subjective notion of fairness," which
implicates more than mere equality but advocates for equity in succession
86. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right To Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781, 838 (2005).
87. See Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws, supra note 35, at 10 ("Of all of these [societal] goals, con-
cerns for the family are paramount."); Gaubatz, supra note 18, at 507; see also Fellows et al., Public
Attitudes About Property Distribution at Death, supra note 41, 323-24; Michael J. Higdon, When
Informal Adoption Meets Intestate Succession: The Cultural Myopia of the Equitable Adoption Doc-
trine, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 250 (2008) (finding that historically, one of the primary func-
tions of intestacy laws has been the promotion of the nuclear family); Susan N. Gary, The Parent-
Child Relationship Under Intestacy Statutes, 32 U. MEM. L. REV. 643, 651-52 (2002) [hereinafter
Parent-Child Relationship] (finding that a significant consideration in addition to decedent's intent is
the purpose of providing support for the decedent's family).
88. See Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws, supra note 35, at 10 ("The tension between testamentary
freedom and succession within the family does not exist when a decedent dies intestate because the
decedent has not exercised the available testamentary freedom.").
89. See E. Gary Spitko, An Accrual/Multi-Factor Approach to Intestate Inheritance Rights for Un-
married Committed Partners, 81 OR. L. REv. 255, 270-78 (2002) [hereinafter Inheritance Rights for
Unmarried Committed Partners] (stating that reciprocity in intestacy means recognizing and rewarding
(1) those who contributed to the accumulation of wealth by the decedent and (2) those who have helped
take care of the decedent); Melanie B. Leslie, Enforcing Family Promises: Reliance, Reciprocity, and
Relational Contract, 77 N.C. L. REV. 551 (1999); Frances H. Foster, Linking Support and Inheri-
tance: A New Model From China, 1999 WIs. L. REv. 1199 (1999); Gary, Parent-Child Relationship,
supra note 87, at 652-53 ("Reciprocity as a goal of intestacy statutes also has merit.").
90. See generally UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (2008).
91. See Susan N. Gary, The Oregon Elective Share Statute: Is Reform an impossible Dream?, 44
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 337, 339-41 (2007).
92. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (amended 2008) (Purpose and Scope of Revisions) ("The
revision of this [elective share] section is the first step in the overall plan of implementing a partner-
ship or marital-sharing theory of marriage, with a support theory back-up." (emphasis added)).
93. See Mary Louise Fellows et al., Committed Partners and Inheritance: An Empirical Study, 16
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laws.94 The elective share provisions of the UPC are easily justified under
the fairness objective. 95 The same criticism of protection of the family
app s h a well: if arness is suc a paramount concern for default
rules in succession, then they should be mandatory rules instead.
Yet default rules should not be treated as a testing ground for various
social and economic theories because around half of all estates are pro-
bated via intestacy.96 In addition to the large number of people whose es-
tates are governed by the rules of intestacy, intestate estates are more
likely than not to be lower-income. 97 Therefore, intestacy laws should be
viewed with the same sacrosanct view of a decedent's intent in mind. To
do otherwise would be to effectively punish a large segment of society
who traditionally has more difficulty accessing the legal system.98
Reflecting developing public policy is an amorphous concept which
should be jettisoned in justifying default rules. Maintaining public policy
as the guidepost for drafting default rules means that as public policy
evolves, which it constantly and inexorably does, default rules will have to
be changed. If the laws are not changed frequently enough to reflect con-
tinuously changing public policy, then the underlying intent itself is sub-
verted. Having to frequently make substantive changes to default rules to
reflect changing public policy cuts against the goals of having clear, sta-
ble, and uniform laws.
Additionally, public policy unduly politicizes an area of the law too
important to be dragged into the paralyzing and often disingenuous world
of politics. When the drafters of the UPC say that its default rules are
drafted to reflect "developing public policy" they beg the question: whose
public policy are they intending to reflect? As one example, there is an
ongoing debate in various states across the country over whether, and if so
to what extent, same-sex relationships should be afforded legal recognition
and protection.9 9 Instead of wading into a thorny political debate by adopt-
LAW & INEQ. 1, 12 (1998) ("A second objective of intestacy statutes is to produce a pattern of distri-
bution that the recipients believe is fair and thus does not produce disharmony among expectant takers
or disdain for the legal system.").
94. Id. (listing "equity considerations of financial dependence, reliance, unjust enrichment and
trust").
95. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
96. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 28, at 71 (stating that most people die without a will).
97. See LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON
wILLS, TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 33-36 (3d ed. 2002) ("One study found that, in terms of
wealth, 72.3% of persons with estates valued between $0 and $99,000 do not have wills, 49.8% with
estates between $100,000 and $199,000 do not have wills, but only 15.4% with estates between
$200,000 and $1 million do not have wills.").
98. Succession laws that ignore, or even contradict, decedent's intent are dangerously close to becom-
ing penalty defaults. See infra Part I.C.5.
99. Massachusetts, Connecticut, Iowa, New Hampshire, and Vermont recognize same-sex marriage.
Washington D.C. recently passed a same-sex marriage bill which will take effect after review by
Congress. New Jersey provides for same-sex civil unions. Hawaii has created the reciprocal benefici-
ary system to provide some legal benefits to same-sex couples. Oregon, Maine, Maryland, Nevada,
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ing one public policy over another," sticking to attempting to effectuate
decedent's intent would allow the UPC to be as apolitical as possible'o
since, after all, decedent's intent is the cornerstone of succession laws. In
the end, the result would be the same, but it would be based on an ideo-
logically consistent framework rather than on a complicated structure that
was created under the guise of ulterior motives.
If the UPC drafters wish to avoid the perception that the UPC has "en-
dorsed" same-sex relationships, they can abrogate this concern by switch-
ing to a scheme that values decedent's intent above all else, which does
not require the UPC to make any policy statements or judgments about
what is or is not the correct "developing public policy."
4. Transformative Defaults
Transformative defaults are very similar to normative defaults in that
both implicate larger societal issues,102 and "[t]ransformative defaults are
similar to normative defaults because both attempt to produce fair or just
results."103 However, while normative defaults attempt to reflect various
social concerns, be they fairness, protecting the family, rewarding recip-
rocity, etc.," proponents of transformative defaults believe that the laws
themselves can be used to implement social change. 0"
A subset of the transformative default is the so-called "expressive
function,"' which states basically that intestacy laws are used to express
society's approval or disapproval of certain behavior.0 7 Individuals "who
and Washington state offer some form of domestic partnership system which provides benefits which
vary in scope from state to state. Though California recognized same-sex marriages for a brief time as
a result of a state supreme court decision, that same decision was effectively overturned by a statewide
referendum; the approximately 18,000 marriages that occurred in the interim, however, are still rec-
ognized. Many states, on the other hand, have placed provisions in their state constitutions forbidding
the recognition of same-sex marriage and in some cases civil unions and domestic partnerships as well.
National Public Radio, State By State: The Legal Battle Over Gay Marriage,
http:www.npr.org/templates/sto ry/story.php?storylD = 112448663.
100. By stating its goal as reflecting "developing public policy" and then ignoring the existence of
same-sex couples in its intestacy statutes, the UPC has effectively taken a stance in this public policy
debate. It has been said that "[slilence is sometimes the severest criticism." Charles Buxton, Brainy
Quote, http:www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/c/charlesbux378076.html (last visited Jan. 12,
2010).
101. See Hirsch, Default Rules, supra note 1, at 1058 ("In due time, scholars might rue the day when
they gave their imprimatur to the politicization of inheritance law.").
102. For a detailed discussion of transformative defaults, see id. at 1053-59.
103. Schwartz, supra note 50, at 391.
104. See supra Part I.C.3 (regarding Normative Default Theories).
105. See Schwartz, supra note 50, at 391 ("[A] transformative default rule is adopted to persuade
parties to prefer the result the rule directs."); Hirsch, Default Rules, supra note 1, at 1053-54 ("Law
affects the actions of citizens . . . by 'making statements' that imbue those actions with new social
meanings and alter the private judgments citizens face within their communities.").
106. For a detailed discussion of the expressive function, see Spitko, Expressive Function, supra note
60.
107. Id. at I100-01.
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experience the law operating upon them personally and those who observe
the law operating on others are likely to learn whom the law respects, ig-
nores, privileges, and disadvantages . . . . [I]ntestacy law not only reflects
society's familial norms but also helps to shape and maintain them."'
It seems tautological to base an entire intestacy theory around the no-
tion that laws express approval or disapproval for certain actions-is that
not the basic function of most laws?'" Laws are by their very nature, or at
least as a side-effect of their existence, designed to establish boundaries of
acceptable conduct. 10 If the purpose behind the scholars pressing the ex-
pressive function of intestacy laws is to advocate inclusion for those who
have been left out of intestacy laws,"' effectuating the testator's presumed
intent seems the most efficient and effective way to go about this.
5. Penalty Defaults
An intestacy policy that has, not surprisingly, proven unpopular is the
so-called penalty default." 2 Originating in the realm of contract law,113 the
penalty default function posits that instead of default rules reflecting dece-
dent's probable intent, they should "enhance efficiency by contradicting
preferences."114 Penalty defaults, in essence, incentivize individuals to put
a testamentary scheme in writing so as to avoid the "punishment" of an
undesirable intestacy scheme controlling the disposition of property."'
This is primarily because the logical extension of the punitive theory is
property escheating to the state."'
108. Id. at 1100. "[Sjome social conservatives fear, and advocates for gay and lesbian equality seek,
reforms such as extension of intestate inheritance rights to same-sex couples principally for the mes-
sage that such changes in the law would proclaim to society." Id. at 1066. See also T.P. Gallanis,
Default Rules, Mandatory Rules, and the Movement for Same-Sex Equality, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1513,
1529 (1999) (discussing the argument that current default rules function to express society's disap-
proval of nonheterosexual relationships).
109. "Law is a solemn expression of the will of the supreme power of the State." CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 22 (2008) (emphasis added).
110. See United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Guenther, 281 U.S. 34, 37 (1930) ("'[L]aw[,]'
used in a generic sense, . . . mean[s] the rules of action or conduct duly prescribed by controlling
authority, and having binding legal force . . . .").
111. Prior to the 2008 UPC Amendments, posthumously conceived children were not considered
children for intestacy purposes. Even after the 2008 UPC Amendments, the UPC still does not address
(and therefore in essence does not permit) second-parent adoptions or spousal classification for same-
sex couples. See Frances H. Foster, The Family Paradigm of Inheritance Law, 80 N.C. L. REv. 199,
200 (2001) ("At the dawn of the twenty-first century, the inheritance system stands as one of the last
bastions of the traditional American family. Many of its rules and doctrines appear frozen in time,
remnants of a bygone era of nuclear families bound together by lifelong affection and support.").
112. For a detailed discussion of penalty defaults, see Hirsch, Default Rules, supra note 1, at 1058-
61.
113. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 50.
114. Hirsch, Default Rules, supra note 1, at 1058.
115. Id.
116. What is more punitive than the government permanently taking ownership of the intestate prop-
erty? Some scholars have advocated escheat as the ultimate weapon to incentivize will drafting. See
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Under this regime, the default rules would effectively become a
grossly regressive taxing scheme. Penalty defaults that escheated property
to the state would create a binary system in which the right to disposition
of property would extend beyond the grave for wealthy property owners
but would terminate upon death for poor property owners."'
Though the extent and existence of testamentary freedom is the subject
of considerable debate, the allocation of property rights should not be
predicated merely upon the wealth of individuals.
D. Decedent's Intent Should Govern Default Rules in Succession Laws
As has been shown, testamentary intent is the most important policy
concern for succession laws in general. For various reasons, this goal has
decreased in importance when discussing default rules of succession laws.
In fact, there seems to be an ideological trend in the United Sates to curtail
testamentary freedom. It is time for the policy goal of default rules to
match the overall goal of succession laws. Creating default rules whose
primary, indeed only, purpose is to effectuate testator's intent will create a
succession law system that is unified behind the same overarching con-
cern. For this and the above reasons, this Article rejects all of the afore-
mentioned default rule theories, except intent-effectuating default theory,
as needlessly complicating the reasons for having default rules in the first
place. If a particular paternalistic concern is sufficiently great to justify
curtailing testamentary freedom, this concern should be addressed through
the use of mandatory rules. Indeed, returning to intent-effectuation avoids
a system of testamentary apartheid in which testator's intent is sacrosanct
only if one is able to draft a complete will that is unambiguous enough to
never implicate a default rule."'
II. CASE STUDY: THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE (UPC) AND THE 2008
UPC AMENDMENTS
To better understand the substantive policy changes evidenced within
the 2008 UPC Amendments, one must first look descriptively at the
changes themselves. Inherent in evaluating these changes is a need to ex-
Olin L. Browder, Jr., Recent Patterns of Testate Succession in the United States and England, 67
MICH. L. REv. 1303, 1312 (1969) ("A decedent who was unhappy with such [an escheat] schedule
would presumably be induced to make a judgment by will which would probably be more thoughtful
and sensible than a mechanical pursuit of his remote kindred.").
117. With "wealthy" and "poor" being respectively defined as those who can and cannot afford an
attorney to draft a will.
118. Although there are noble societal needs concerning surviving spouses and child welfare, these
needs do not have to displace testamentary freedom. The sustainability of a reasonable social safety net
and redistributive concerns might be more efficient being implemented through the tax system and
family law.
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amine both the 1990 (pre-Amendment) rules and the 2008 UPC Amend-
ments.
A. Pre-2008 UPC Amendments
In 1990, the UPC was substantially amended, including revisions to
rules governing the parent-child relationship and class gifts." 9 These 1990
Amendments are the "default rules" that help to illustrate the substantive
overhaul proposed by the 2008 UPC Amendments.' 20
Before the 2008 UPC Amendments, a parent-child relationship was
primarily understood as a natural relationship based solely upon biological
reproduction.12 1 Child status for inheritance purposes followed easily from
the recognition of this natural fact, or, in the case of adoption, from the
statutory creation of a legal substitute designed to replicate the genetic
original. 122
Accordingly, the former UPC section 2-114 permitted children to in-
herit from their genetic parents. 123 In fact, children could inherit from both
genetic parents regardless of their parents' marital status-thereby over-
turning an old common law rule denying inheritance to children born out
of wedlock.124
The former statute also recognized a reciprocal parent-child relation-
ship between an adopting parent and an adopted child.125 For instance,
parents could inherit from or through their adopted children, and adopted
children could inherit from or through their adoptive parents. 126 Although
an adoption generally severed the respective inheritance rights by and be-
tween genetic parents and their biological children (thereby effectuating a
"fresh start" policy 27), former section 2-114(b) created a stepparent ex-
ception to this severance.128 Under this exception, a child could inherit
from or through a stepparent, a genetic custodial spouse, and a genetic
119. These revisions were so significant that many professors and practitioners label the UPC revision
of 1990 as "the 1990 UPC." See, e.g., Averill, supra note 30, at 892.
120. As a practical matter, establishing the law prior to the 2008 UPC Amendments is integral for
illustrating the policy goals of the prior UPC in contrast to the policy goals implicit in the 2008 UPC
Amendments.
121. David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of Transition: Tensions Between Legal, Biological, and
Social Conceptions of Parenthood, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. Supp. 125, 125 (2006).
122. Id. at 125-26.
123. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114 (amended 2008), 8 U.L.A. 91 (1998).
124. Id. § 2-114(a); see also Patricia G. Roberts, Adopted and Nonrnarital Children-Exploring the
1990 Unmform Probate Code's Intestacy and Class Gift Provisions, 32 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.
539, 542 (1998).
125. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114(b) (amended 2008), 8 U.L.A. 91 (1998).
126. Id.
127. The fresh start policy manifests the belief that it is in the best interest of a child to sever emo-
tional and financial ties with the genetic parents to facilitate the creation of new ties with the adoptive
parents. Roberts, supra note 124, at 542-43.
128. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114(b) (amended 2008), 8 U.L.A. 91 (1998).
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noncustodial parent. 129 Finally, under former section 2-114, parents could
lose their rights to inherit from or through their children if they refused to
support their children. 130
The former UPC section 2-114 was blissfully simple and concise, yet
maddeningly arcane and brittle. On one hand, the former UPC provision
relied on familiar state family laws regarding the parent-child relationship,
and it was written clearly enough for laymen to read and generally under-
stand its implications. That clarity empowered individuals to opt out by
drafting a will.
On the other hand, former section 2-114 did not account for new types
of family structures, the decline of the nuclear family model, and advances
in reproductive and genetic technologies involving surrogacy, sperm/egg
donation, genetic mapping, and cloning. Nor did it take into account the
growing number of same-sex couples or single individuals who were be-
coming parents through ART.
The bright-line tests and exceptions of the former Section 2-114 were
quickly becoming outdated. A revision was sorely needed. Therefore, the
Commissioners 31 drafted and approved significant revisions to the parent-
child relationship provisions and the class gift provision of the UPC in
July of 2008.132 Unfortunately, to the majority of families for whom ART
and adoption are fiscally out of reach, these changes amount to little more
than technical corrections.
129. Id. For instance, when a child's parent dies or gives up parental rights, and the child's surviving
parent remarries, this exception provides that remarriage of the surviving parent and subsequent adop-
tion of the child by a stepparent does not sever the child's right to inherit from his deceased parent's
relatives. The stepparent and genetic custodial parent inherit from or through the child; however, the
genetic noncustodial parent no longer has the right to inherit from or through the child. Id. § 2-114(b)
cmt.
130. Id. § 2-114(c). This change applies to both the mother and father, instead of solely to the father,
as in the pre-1990 UPC. Id. § 2-114(c) cmt. Such a rule seems to endorse notions of family law or
cultural norms (incentivizing parents to support their dependent children) as well as approximating
decedent's intent for disposition of his property; when a parent has refused to provide support for the
child, we assume that the decedent child would not have wished his nonsupporting parent to take from
the estate.
131. The ten-person drafting Committee consisted primarily of trusts and estates and tax attorneys.
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Amendments to Unform Probate
Code 3 (2008), http://www.law.upenn.edulbll/archives/ulc/upc/2008amends.pdf. Interestingly, how-
ever, Committee member Harry L. Tindall (Chair of the Uniform Parentage Act drafting committee)
practices in the area of family law-an area with significant influence on the 2008 UPC Amendments.
See Law Firm Biography of Harry L. Tindall, http://www.tindallfoster.com/familyattorneys/ har-
ryltindall.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2010).
132. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Amendments to Unform Pro-
bate Code (2008), http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/upc/2008amends.pdf.
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B. The 2008 UPC Amendments
1. Parent-Child Relationship1 33
The 2008 UPC Amendments acknowledge that parentage is a much
more complicated affair these days. For instance, it used to be that a
mother-child relationship was self-apparent, as the mother actually gave
birth to the child.134 Because a woman giving birth to a child was relatively
undisputed, the law rarely confronted the question of legal motherhood.'
But egg donations and gestational surrogacy now make identifying a
mother-child relationship more difficult. Fathers' genetic connections al-
ways have been less apparent, so legal paternity traditionally has been
inferred "through a network of presumptions and defenses."l 36 For exam-
ple, the husband of a woman who gave birth was presumed to be the fa-
ther of her child.' But, DNA testing and advancements in ART (such as
sperm donations) make presuming and recognizing the father-child rela-
tionship more difficult as well. 138
Into this breach, the UPC has leapt. Rather than merely referring to or
incorporating relevant state family law or the Uniform Parentage Act
(UPA) to define a parent-child relationship, the UPC now seeks to explic-
itly define such relationships within its own text for its own purposes. 3
While often borrowing the UPA's definitions and categories for de-
termining parent-child status, 40 the 2008 UPC Amendments do not adopt
verbatim all of the UPA's definitions for the parent-child relationship.14 '
As a result, decisions determining legal parentage might not sync with
decisions determining a parent-child relationship for inheritance purposes.
The 2008 UPC Amendments replace the former section 2-114 with
nine intricate sections defining the parent-child relationship for succession
133. For other articles describing the parent-child relationship changes made by the 2008 UPC
Amendments, see Tritt, Sperms and Estates, supra note 9, and Gary, We are Family, supra note 60.
134. See Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: an Interpretive Approach to the Determina-
tion of Legal Parentage, 113 HARv. L. REV 835, 912 (2000) (noting that "courts have not typically
distinguished gestation from genetic tie for the simple reason that, for a child conceived sexually, they
are inextricably linked.").
135. Id.
136. Meyer, supra note 121, at 127.
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., Doe v. Doe, 20 So.3d 892 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2009) (holding that a father-
child relationship that had been recognized in a valid divorce settlement rendered the child able to
inherit from a trust which was restricted to "children and descendants by blood," notwithstanding a
DNA paternity test that indicated that the "father" could not have been the parent of the child).
139. Tritt, Sperms and Estates, supra note 9, at 407 (explaining that the UPA and state family laws
provide "rules for determining ['legal parentage'] in order to determine, among other things, family
law issues, such as identifying who will [make] decisions concerning the . . . child's well being," have
custody, provide support, and have visitation rights).
140. Id. at 407.
141. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 102 (2000).
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law purposes. 14 2 Interestingly, and perhaps tellingly, to determine a child's
inheritance rights, the UPC has switched from defining the child's status
to identifying and categorizing the parents' status. Thus, the UPC Com-
mittee drafted numerous complex rules regarding adoption, illegitimate
children, ART, and posthumously conceived children.
i. Genetic Parents
The 2008 UPC Amendments retain genetics as the seminal building
block for parent-child status. Under UPC section 2-117, "a parent-child
relationship exists between a child and the child's genetic parents, regard-
less of the parents' marital status," 143 unless an individual is included or
excluded as a "parent" under one of the other sections. Section 2-115(6)
defines genetic mother as "the woman whose egg was fertilized by the
sperm of a child's genetic father."" Section 2-115(5) defines genetic fa-
ther as "the man whose sperm fertilized the egg of a child's genetic
mother," or, if a presumption of paternity exists under applicable state
law, the man for whom that relationship is established.14 5
ii. Adoptive Parents
The newly added section 2-118 begins with the general rule that a par-
ent-child relationship exists between an adoptive parent and an adopted
child-an adopted child may inherit from the adoptive parent, and vice-
versa.1" Similar to the previous UPC provision, when a child is adopted,
his legal relationship generally is severed with his genetic parents and be-
gins anew with his adoptive parents. 147
142. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114-2-122 (2008).
143. Id. § 2-117. Even the 1990 UPC represents a divergence from earlier versions of the UPC,
where a child born out of wedlock was considered a child of his or her birth mother, but a parent-
child relationship with the father for intestacy purposes was either determined by the UPA or was not
presumed under applicable state law unless the parents were married (even if the marriage was void)
prior to the child's birth or paternity was proven by clear and convincing evidence. UNIF. PROBATE
CODE § 2-109 (amended 2008), 8 U.L.A. 284 (1998). Further, a father established merely by pater-
nity testing could not inherit from the child unless the father had supported the child or openly held the
child out as his own. Id.; see Megan Pendleton, Intestate Inheritance Claims: Determining a Child's
Right to Inherit When Biological and Presumptive Paternity Overlap, 29 CARDOZO L. REv. 2823,
2833-34 (2008) (discussing the interplay of paternity and genetics between the UPC and UPA). Given
the evolution of the UPC's position regarding children born out of wedlock, the UPC seemed to mir-
ror its own rules in this area on normative theories-as children born to unmarried parents became
more common and culturally accepted, the rules in this area were modernized to match the prevailing
cultural norms.
144. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-115(6) (2008).
145. Id. § 2-115(5). Accordingly, a "genetic father" may be "presumed" to be the father and not be
the individual whose sperm actually fertilized the egg.
146. Id. § 2-118(a).
147. See id. § 2-119(a); see also id. § 2-119(e) cmt. (stating that a child's genetic parents are the
parents determined under UPC section 2-120 or UPC section 2-121. Basically, UPC section 2-119(e)
300 [Vol. 61:2:273
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Section 2-119 retains the stepparent adoption exception (in the case
that a child's parent dies and the surviving parent remarries, this exception
provides that remarriage of the surviving parent and subsequent adoption
of the child by a stepparent will not sever the child's right to inherit from
his or her deceased parent's relatives). 148 But the 2008 UPC Amendments
also provide two new exceptions to adoption's fresh start policy. First, a
child still may inherit from or through both genetic parents if the child is
adopted by "a relative of a genetic parent, or by the spouse or surviving
spouse of a relative of a genetic parent. "149 Here, only the child has the
right to inherit; parents who give up custody cannot later inherit from their
child."so Second, a child may inherit through his or her genetic parents if
both the child's genetic parents die, and then some third party (relative or
stranger) adopts the child.'
One of the most striking changes in the 2008 UPC Amendments in-
cludes technical definitions that define "adoptive parents" for inheritance
purposes. Section 2-118(b) creates a parent-child relationship between an
individual and child who is "in the process of being adopted" by the indi-
vidual (but before the adoption is legalized formally).' 52 This relationship
is created in two circumstances: (1) if a married couple is in the process of
adopting a child when one of the spouses dies, then the surviving spouse
finalizes the adoption; 153 and (2) if a stepparent is in the process of adopt-
puts a child of assisted reproduction or a gestational child in the same position as a genetic child for
the purposes of section 2-119.).
148. See infra Part III.B.4.i; see also Gary, We Are Family, supra note 60, at 176 (stating that a child
still inherits from the noncustodial genetic parent even if the noncustodial genetic parent no longer
takes care of or even sees the child).
149. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-119(c) (2008). A "relative" is defined as a child's "grandparent or a
descendant of [the child's] grandparent." Id. § 2-115(9). Under the stepparent adoption scenario, a
child could potentially inherit from three parents.
150. Id. § 2-119(c).
151. Id. § 2-119(d); cf. Roberts, supra note 124, at 553-54 (describing a scenario under the 1990
UPC where a child loses his inheritance rights from his paternal grandmother when both his genetic
parents die and he is adopted by a person related to his genetic mother). Typically, this exception
might apply where a mother (M) and father (F) have a child (C). Both M and F die, and C is adopted
by new parent, (N). When M's father (G) dies intestate, C would inherit from G. The drafters likely
perceive that in this scenario, C would stay in contact with his or her genetic family. In fact, the
comment to section 2-119(d) states the assumption that the child will maintain ties with the genetic
family and that the genetic family may play a part in deciding who will adopt the child. UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 2-119 cmt. (2008); see also E. Gary Spitko, Open Adoption, Inheritance, and the
"Uncleing" Principle, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 765, 784-85 (2008) (explaining that the probable
rationale for the exceptions is that the genetic parent acted as a parent of the child and that the genetic
family still considers the child to be a part of the family). Further, because M and F died rather than
giving up C for adoption of their own volition, we may also presume that there was no intent to sever
the familial ties at all, so implementing the fresh start policy here would benefit no one.
Finally, this provision likely would approximate the testator's intent-society would assume
that a parent who has predeceased his or her own child would wish to provide support or inheritance to
his or her own grandchild, even if necessity required that the grandchild had subsequently been
adopted.
152. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-118(b)(2) (2008).
153. Id. § 2-118(b)(1).
HeinOnline  -- 61 Ala. L. Rev. 301 2009-2010
Alabama Law Review
ing a child when the stepparent dies and the stepparent's spouse survived
the deceased stepparent by 120 hours.154
For example, under section 2-118(b), an individual who is "in the
process of being adopted" by a married couple, but not yet legally adopted
when one of the soon-to-be adoptive spouses dies, can nonetheless inherit
from that deceased spouse.' This result ostensibly effectuates the dece-
dent's intent, because the decedent apparently intended to complete the
adoption and become a legal parent. (However, because this scenario does
not constitute an exception to the UPC's genetic parent foundation, the
adoptee would still be permitted to inherit from his or her genetic parents
if either or both died during the process of the adoption.)
This new rule applies only to married couple adoption"' and steppar-
ent adoption, 1' not to couples who choose not to get married or cannot
get married. Therefore, the rule discriminates against couples who choose
not to get married or cannot get married.
Unfortunately, section 2-118 does not define "in the process of being
adopted," leaving significant ambiguity and room for judicial interpreta-
tion; but, this is intentional.' The comments to section 2-118 state that
this phrase is flexible and should be interpreted on a case-by-case basis. 1'
Accordingly, this standard may not promote predictability and could lead
to inconsistent results.
Curiously, section 2-119 does not provide for second-parent adop-
tion;"s the provision only allows for a genetic parent's parent-child rela-
tionship to continue when a stepparent adopts the child, not an unmarried
partner (even though state adoption laws would continue to recognize the
parental status of the genetic parent). Under the single-parent adoption
rule, the genetic parent is legally displaced and no longer has a parent-
154. Id. § 2-118(b)(2) (noting that the genetic parent must survive the deceased stepparent by 120
hours for the child to inherit from the deceased stepparent); see also id. § 2-118(c) cmt. (stating that a
child may inherit from and through a stepparent who dies while in the process of adopting the child
when the child was born through assisted reproduction or is a gestational child. "An example would be
a situation in which an unmarried mother or father is the parent of a child of assisted reproduction ...
and subsequently marries an individual who then begins the process of adopting the child but who dies
before the adoption becomes final.").
155. Id. § 2-118(b)(1).
156. Id.
157. Id. § 2-118(b)(2).
158. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-118(b)(1).
159. Id. § 2-118(b) cmt. Alternatively, because the process of adoption is governed by state family
laws, family law (and not the UPC) is likely a better point of reference regarding the process of adop-
tion and whether a parent was in the process of adopting a child for parent-child relationship purposes.
160. Tritt, Sperms and Estates, supra note 9, at 184 n.312. Second-parent adoption is a legal proce-
dure that allows an unmarried same-sex partner to adopt his partner's biological or adopted children
without terminating the first parent's right as a parent. Peter Wendel, Inheritance Rights and the Step-
Partner Adoption Paradigm: Shades of Discrimination Against Illegitimate Children, 34 HOFsTRA L.
REv. 351, 374-75, 380 (2005).
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child relationship with the child for intestacy purposes.'6 1 So, for example,
if a genetic birth mother in a same-sex couple wishes her partner to adopt
the child so that the couple may jointly raise the child, the UPC would
sever the birth mother's parent-child relationship for inheritance pur-
poses. 16 2
Although a growing minority of states has begun recognizing second-
parent adoption,163 the UPC provides no protections for children to inherit
in states in which second-parent adoption is now recognized. Ironically,
recognition of second-parent adoption or reliance on state law would likely
approximate the intent of the testator-a parent who has adopted a child or
has raised the child as his or her own would most likely wish and presume
that, assuming a valid adoption, the child would inherit under state probate
laws. From a family law perspective, parents in states that both allow sec-
ond-parent adoption and enact the 2008 UPC Amendments are faced with
a dilemma: if they choose to adopt the child to provide legal and parental
rights during the parents' and child's lifetime, they risk detriment if the
birth parent has not executed a valid will.
iii. Children Conceived By Artificial Reproductive Technology
For the first time, the UPC explored the parent-child relationship as it
relates to the growing field of ART.
People use ART for a variety of reasons-some use ART to overcome
infertility problems, some because they are in a same-sex relationship, and
some use ART because they are single. ART can achieve conception with-
out sex, so people who want a child may use sperm, ova, or gestational
services that have been donated or sold. The parentage of children con-
ceived through ART is often unclear and these children may have connec-
tions to multiple adults. For instance, it is now possible for a child to have
three potential "mothers": the egg donor, the gestational surrogate, and
the woman who plans the pregnancy and intends to raise the child as the
legal mother.'64 It is also possible for a child to have three potential "fa-
thers": the sperm donor, the husband to the gestational surrogate, and the
161. Wendel, supra note 160, at 374-75.
162. This absurd result happens in heterosexual unmarried relationships as well. See id. at 374, 380;
see also Gary, We Are Family, supra note 60, at 178-79 (stressing that after the genetic parent's
partner adopts the child, the genetic parent must adopt the child in order for the child to inherit from
the genetic parent).
163. See Human Rights Campaign, Second-Parent Adoption, http://www.hrc.org/issues/2385.htm
(last visited Jan. 12, 2010). Second-parent adoption is legal by court opinion or statute in the District
of Colombia, California, Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania,
and Vermont. Id. Second-parent adoption has been granted in eighteen other states. Id.
164. Naomi Cahn, Children's Interests and Information Disclosure: Who Provided the Egg and
Sperm? Or Mommy, Where (and Whom) Do I Come From?, 2 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 1, 1 (2000).
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man who plans the pregnancy and intends to be legally recognized as the
father.165
The 2008 UPC Amendments attempt to cover the possible parent-
child scenarios that could result from existing methods of ART with speci-
ficity, using complicated codified variables. The Amendments attempt to
create technology-specific rules targeted to the various types of ART that
currently exist.16 6 Unfortunately, sections 2-120 and 2-121 are complex,
unwieldy, and "cloaked in language only a lawyer could love." 167 When
read together, these provisions clearly seek to determine parentage accord-
ing to intent. "That is, the individuals who, at the time of conception, in-
tended to raise the child [are] deemed to be the child's parents" for inheri-
tance purposes.' 68 This bears repeating: it is important to remember that
these rules apply only for determining parentage for inheritance pur-
poses-not for family law purposes.
"The 2008 UPC Amendments divide the definition of a parent-child
relationship for children conceived by ART into two sections"'69: (1) one
in which no woman is acting merely as a gestational carrier, and (2) one in
which a woman involved is acting solely as a gestational carrier.170
a. No Mere Gestational Carrier Is Involved
Section 2-120 concerns parents who use ART and are each either the
genetic or intended parent; no woman is acting solely as a gestational car-
rier in the process. Clearly in these cases, a parent-child relationship ex-
ists between the birth mother"' and the child.7 2 Therefore, if the birth
mother was artificially inseminated (either by her husband or a sperm do-
nor) or was impregnated using in vitro fertilization with an egg provided
by an egg donor, the birth mother is deemed a "parent" for parent-child
property succession purposes.
Generally, there is no parent-child relationship between a third-party
donor of genetic material (a sperm donor other than the husband or an egg
donor other than the mother) and the child.173 Even though the donor is
165. Id.
166. These codified variables are inextricably linked to the development of ART. As ART is con-
stantly evolving, the codified amendments' variables will fast become antiquated.
167. Tritt, Sperms and Estates, supra note 9, at 410.
168. Id. The provisions are both gender- and marital status-neutral, thereby adding protections to
same-sex and opposite sex unmarried couples.
169. Id. at 411.
170. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-120-2-121 (2008).
171. Id. § 2-120(a)(1) (defining birth mother as "a woman, other than a gestational carrier under
section 2-121, who gives birth to a child of assisted reproduction. The term is not limited to a woman
who is the child's genetic mother.").
172. Id. § 2-120(c).
173. Id. § 2-120(b) cmt. (stating that this section is consistent with UPA section 702).
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technically the genetic parent of the child, there will be no parent-child
relationship unless established under another provision of the UPC.
A parent-child relationship will exist between the child and the birth
mother's husband if the husband provided the sperm and the sperm was
used during the husband's lifetime.17 4 Under this ART (sometimes called
artificial insemination by husband, or AIH), the husband would neverthe-
less be the genetic parent. Note that this section only applies if the hus-
band's sperm were used during his lifetime by his wife-it does not apply
to posthumous conception."'
In addition to the birth mother, a parent-child relationship will exist
between the child and an individual, if any, who is identified on the birth
certificate as the child's parent."' This section grants presumptive effect to
a birth certificate identifying an individual other than the birth mother as
the other parent of child conceived by ART.
A parent-child relationship also may be established by an individual
(other than the birth mother) if the individual "consented" to the assisted
reproduction by the birth mother with the intent to be treated as the other
parent.'77 Consent may be established in two ways. First, consent is estab-
lished if the individual signed a record, before or after the child's birth,
evidencing the individual's consent."'7 Second, consent may be established
if the individual functioned as a parent of the child no later than two years
after the child's birth.7 9 The 2008 UPC Amendments do not require the
individual to function as a parent for any certain period of time.' More-
over, an individual who is prevented from carrying out his or her intent to
function as the parent of the child "by death, incapacity, or other circum-
stances" can have a parent-child relationship with the child if the individ-
ual can establish that he or she intended to function as a parent of the child
no later than two years after the child's birth.'
Interestingly, the 2008 UPC Amendments open the door for inheri-
tance by a child conceived by ART through two parents of the same sex.
174. Id. § 2-120(d).
175. Id.
176. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(e) (2008) (stating that the individual on the birth certificate is
presumed to be the parent of the child).
177. Id. § 2-120(f). The individual's genetic material might or might not have been used to create the
pregnancy.
178. Id. § 2-120(f)(1). Consent may be withdrawn, in a record, before the use of harvested eggs or
sperm, or placement in utero of embryos. If a marriage is dissolved before such placement, the result-
ing child is not the child of the former spouse unless there is a signed consent to be the child's parent.
Id. § 2-120(i).
179. Id. § 2-120(f)(2)(A); see also id. § 2-120(h)(1) (stating that there is a presumption that the birth
mother's spouse satisfies § 2-120(f)(2)(A) unless clear and convincing evidence establishes otherwise).
180. See id. §§ 2-120(a)(3); 2-120(e); 2-120(f).
181. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(f)(2)(B) (2008); see id. §2 -120(h)(1) (stating that there is a
presumption that the birth mother's spouse satisfies section 2-120(f)(2)(B) unless clear and convincing
evidence establishes otherwise).
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Using section 2-120(f) as an example, because it uses words such as "in-
dividual" and "other parent" instead of "father" or "spouse," a lesbian
woman, other than the birth mother, who consented to the assisted repro-
duction with intent to be treated as the child's other parent, is a parent of
that child under the UPC.
b. A Gestational Carrier Is Involved
Section 2-121 defines the parent-child relationship when a child is
born to a gestational carrier. 82 That is to say, the birth mother is neither
the intended parent nor the genetic parent, but rather she gives birth under
a gestational agreement.'83 A parent-child relationship may be established
by a court order designating an individual or individuals as the parent or
parents of a child born to a gestational carrier-a woman who is not an
intended parent and who gives birth to a child under a gestational agree-
ment.184 If there is no court order,
[w]ith respect to children born to a gestational [carrier], the child
will be the child of the intended parents"' and not of the gesta-
tional [carrier]." [But] [i]ntent alone is not sufficient. A parent-
child relationship only exists if the intended parent functioned as a
parent of the child no later than two years after the child's birth or
died while the gestational carrier was pregnant."'
In addition, a married individual who dies while the child is being car-
ried by a gestational carrier and who intended to be treated as a parent of
the child born to the gestational carrier also is considered a parent under
the UPC Amendments."
182. Id. § 2-121(a)(2) (defining gestational carrier as "a woman who is not an intended parent who
gives birth to a child under a gestational agreement. The term is not limited to a woman who is the
child's genetic mother."); id. § 2-121(c) (stating that generally a parent-child relationship does not
exist between the child and the child's gestational carrier).
183. Id. § 2-121(b). Gestational agreement is defined as an "agreement for assisted reproduction in
which a woman agrees to carry a child to birth for an intended parent." Id. § 2-121(a)(1). An intended
parent is defined as "an individual who entered into a gestational agreement providing that the individ-
ual will be the parent of a child born to a gestational carrier by means of assisted reproduction." Id.
§ 2-121(a)(4).
184. Id. § 2-121(b).
185. Id. § 2-120(d). If the child conceived by ART is adopted, then the adoption sections would
govern. See id. §§ 2-118-2-119.
186. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-121(c) (2008).
187. Tritt, Sperms and Estates, supra note 9, at 412; UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-121(d) (2008).
188. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-121(f) (2008); see id. § 2-121(g)(1)-(2) (stating that the presumption
under section 2-121(f) does not apply if there is a court order stating otherwise or there is a signed
record stating otherwise).
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iv. Posthumously Conceived Children
Sections 2-120 and 2-121, when read together, provide the limitations
regarding inheritance by posthumously conceived children. As a result of
ever-advancing medical technology, a testator's sperm or eggs may be
extracted and frozen before or even after the decedent's death."' On the
basis of technology alone (and putting all ethical concerns aside for the
moment), the sperm and eggs may be used for conception long after the
genetic donor has died. In recent years, the law has struggled with
whether children conceived in this way should be able to take under pro-
bate law.'9
Under the 2008 UPC Amendments,
[a] posthumously conceived child will be treated as the child of the
deceased individual if: (i) the individual intended to be treated as a
parent of a posthumously conceived child is established by clear
and convincing evidence, and (ii) the child is in utero not later
than thirty-six months after the decedent's death or born not later
than forty-five months after the individual's death.191
The rationale for the 36 to 45 month window is to provide the surviv-
ing spouse or partner enough time for a period of grieving and time to
decide to have a child by assisted reproduction. 9 2
Interestingly, the surviving parent need not be the genetic parent of the
posthumously conceived child. 93 Moreover, even if the genetic parent
fails to provide a written record stating that he or she intends to be treated
as the parent of a posthumously conceived child, the parent can still be
considered the parent of the posthumously conceived child if clear and
convincing evidence establishes that the parent intended to function as the
parent of the child."
189. For a discussion of the moral, ethical, and legal issues surrounding posthumous conception (or
posthumous assisted reproduction (PAR)), see G. Bahadar, Death and Conception, 17 HUMAN
REPRODUCTION 2769 (2002).
190. See Tritt, Sperms and Estates, supra note 9, at 378; see also Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, Con-
ceiving the Inconceivable: Legal Recognition of the Posthumously Conceived Child, 34 ACTEC J.
154, 160 (2008) (addressing the various legal issues and arguing that awarding inheritance rights to
posthumously conceived children should turn on three factors: decedent's consent to the conception,
proof of parentage, and length of time between the decedent's death and the conception).
191. Tritt, Sperms and Estates, supra note 9, at 412; UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(k) (2008).
192. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(k) cmt. (2008).
193. Gary, We Are Family, supra note 60, at 184 (stating that there is no requirement for the parent
to be the genetic parent because of the possibility of pooled parenting). For example, the mother of the
decedent could request his sperm be extracted, procure a surrogate to carry the pregnancy, and then
raise the child as her own. If, however, the parent is not the spouse or genetic relative of the decedent,
the child will be excluded from class membership under section 2-705(e) unless the testator's will
expressly states otherwise. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-705(e) (2008).
194. Gary, We Are Family, supra note 60, at 184.
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v. Parents by Equitable Adoption
Section 2-122 states that the 2008 UPC Amendments do not impede or
affect the doctrine of equitable adoption.195
Equitable adoption (also called virtual adoption, adoption by es-
toppel, and de facto adoption) is an equitable remedy construed by
courts to avoid what is perceived as an injustice arising from a
strict application of the intestacy statutes.'" An equitably adopted
child is a child not legally adopted by the decedent, although the
child was raised by the decedent in the decedent's home as the de-
cedent's child.'" An individual asserts a claim of equitable adop-
tion in order to take an intestate share of the decedent's estate."'
vi. "Functioning as a Parent of the Child" and Inheritance by
a Genetic Parent
Under section 2-114, a parent is barred from inheriting from or
through a child if "the parent's parental rights were terminated."' 99 Fur-
ther, a parent may be barred from inheriting from or through a child even
if his or her parental rights are not terminated, if (1) the child dies before
reaching his or her eighteenth birthday, and (2) clear and convincing evi-
dence illustrates that the parent's parental rights "could have been termi-
nated . . . on the basis of nonsupport, abandonment, abuse, neglect, or
other actions or inactions of the parent toward the child."20
The rationale supporting the first clause of section 2-114 is immedi-
ately apparent: when a parent's rights have been terminated, the parent
should not be allowed to obtain any benefit from the child's estate. This
supports three intertwined policies: testator's intent, reciprocity, and puni-
tive goals.20' We are, however, left with a seemingly odd result from the
195. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-122 (2008).
196. See Jan Ellen Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption and Association: Who Should Get What and
Why?, 37 VAND. L. REv. 711, 767 (1984); James R. Robinson, Note, Untangling the "Loose
Threads": Equitable Adoption, Equitable Legitimation, and Inheritance in Extralegal Family Arrange-
ments, 48 EMORY L.J. 943, 955 (1999).
197. Robinson, supra note 196, at 955.
198. Tritt, Sperms and Estates, supra note 9, at 384; Robinson, supra note 196, at 955.
199. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114(a)(1) (2008); see also Tritt, Sperms and Estates, supra note 9, at
412 n.333.
200. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114(a)(2) (2008).
201. The UPC drafters likely presumed that a child whose parent's rights were terminated would not
have wished that parent to inherit. As for reciprocity and penalty, if the parent was not providing for
the child, it would seem inequitable that the child's assets should provide any benefit for the parent
whose rights were terminated. Finally, we as a society may wish to demonstrate our disapproval of
parents whose rights are terminated by making clear that those parents can no longer inherit from their
children. Under some theories of social reform, mere articulation of this rule may go far toward im-
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second portion of section 2-114, reiterating a bright-line rule that a parent
whose rights could have been terminated cannot inherit from a child who
dies before the child turns eighteen years of age.202 One might wonder: if a
parent's rights could have been terminated, why should the parent receive
any benefit from his child's estate merely because the child reached eight-
een years of age? Some scholars have opined that when the child reaches
age eighteen, he or she can write a will, and thereby disinherit his or her
parents.203 Moreover, the evidence proving that the parent should have lost
parental rights is old and much harder to prove once the child reaches age
eighteen. 21 On the other hand, given the substantial numbers of Ameri-
cans that die intestate,205 this rationale may prove to be a misguided delu-
sion.
2. Class Gifts
Class gifts allow individuals to devise their property to members of a
particular class (often those in a particular relationship with the testator 206),
rather than writing out the names of each person.207
Class gifts may arise in two scenarios. First, [a class gift may
arise] when the instrument is executed by a testator that refers to
his or her own children . . . . (For example, the testator's will be-
queaths his or her estate to "my children.") Second, [a class gift
may arise] when the instrument is executed by someone other than
a parent figure . . . . (For example, suppose a testator bequeaths
his or her estate to A for life, remainder to A's children.) 208
Before the 2008 UPC Amendments, the members included in a class
turned on whether the testator was a genetic or adoptive parent in relation
plementing more parental support for children.
202. See Gary, We Are Family, supra note 60, at 179.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See Tritt, Sperms and Estates, supra note 9, at 379 n.55.
206. Though the term "testator" is used, because of its simplicity, to denote the decedent who devises
a gift to a particular class, the UPC equally applies to other sorts of dispositive transfers. See UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 2-701 (amended 2008), 8 U.L.A. 138 (1998).
207. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-705 cmt. (2008) ("This section facilitates a modern construction of
gifts that identify the recipient by reference to a relationship to someone . . . .").
A class gift is defined as a disposition to beneficiaries who are described by a group label
and are intended to take as a group. Taking as a group means that the membership of the
class is typically not static, but is subject to fluctuation by increase or decrease until the
time when a class member is entitled to distribution; and upon distribution, the property is
divided among the then-entitled class members on a fractional basis.
Lawrence W. Waggoner, Class Gifts Under the Restatement (Third) of Property, 33 OHIO N.U. L.
REv. 993, 995 (2008) (footnotes omitted).
208. Tritt, Sperms and Estates, supra note 9, at 382.
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to the class members. 209 Generally, if the transferor of the class gift was a
genetic or adoptive parent, the former UPC provided that the genetic2 10
and adopted children were included in the class gift if they qualified to
take under the rules of intestacy. 2 11 By contrast, if the transferor of the
class gift was someone other than the genetic or adoptive parent, the for-
mer UPC provided that an adopted child would be included in the class
only if the child lived as a regular member of the genetic or adopting par-
ent's (or an immediate relative of the genetic or adoptive parent's) house-
hold while the adopted child was a minor.212
Why would the drafters propose a dichotomy according to the testa-
tor's relationship with the class members? By excluding from class mem-
bership those children that the parent did not hold out as his own by rais-
ing as minor children, this rule attempted to approximate and effectuate
the testator's intent. When the testator devises a gift to his own children,
we as a society presume that he intends to provide support for those chil-
dren. Further, we presume that the testator is in the best position to know
who may be included within the class of his children. When the testator
devising a class gift is not the natural or adoptive parent, that testator may
be unaware of potential class members-either persons who were later
adopted (for example, adult adoptions as a means of circumventing pro-
bate laws in same-sex relationships) or illegitimate children. Thus, the
default rule for class gifts, if the testator does not otherwise specify or
define the class members, is that only adopted children that the parent
raised while they were minor children (and held out as his or her own
children) are included in the class gift.213
The 2008 UPC Amendments to the class gift provision not only reflect
changes to both the parent-child relationship as defined within the class,
but they also signal a change in the meaning of children within the class
(as defined by the default intestacy rules of sections 2-118 through 2-
121).214 The 2008 Amendments concerning class gifts apply to the treat-
ment of genetic children, adopted children, nonmarital children, children
conceived by ART, and gestational children. Similar to the former UPC
provisions, the rule is unchanged regarding class gifts where the testator is
an individual other than the parent of the child: if the adoptive parent did
209. Waggoner, supra note 207, at 995.
210. The genetic children may be born out of wedlock. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-705(b) (amended
2008), 8 U.L.A. 143 (1998).
211. Id. § 2-705(b). The child must still satisfy section 2-705(a) to be included in the class gift. See
id. § 2-705(a), (b) cmt.
212. Id. § 2-705(e)-(f); see also Tritt, Sperms and Estates, supra note 9, at 383.
213. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-705(e)-(f) cmt. (amended 2008), 8 U.L.A. 143 (1998); see also
Roberts, supra note 124, at 546.
214. The comments to section 2-705 state that the rules of construction for class gifts are consistent
with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§ 14.5-14.9.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-705 cmt. (2008).
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not function as a parent of the child before the child reached eighteen
years of age, the class will not include the child. 215 This provision, how-
ever, further states that relatives by marriage are not included in a class
gift unless "when the governing instrument was executed, the class was
then and foreseeably would be empty; or . . . the language or circum-
stances otherwise establish that relatives by marriage were intended to be
included." 216
The 2008 UPC Amendments also added a class-closing provision that
incorporates three independent rules .217 First, a child who is in utero at the
testator's death must live 120 hours after birth to be included in the class
gift. 218 Second, if the distribution date is upon the death of the parent, the
posthumously conceived child is included in the class gift if the child is "in
utero not later than 36 months after the deceased parent's death or born
not later than 45 months after the deceased parent's death." 2 19 Third, a
child in the process of being adopted when the class closes is included in
the class gift only if "the adoption is subsequently granted." 220
It should be mentioned in passing that implementation of the 2008
UPC Amendments will necessarily influence the application and interpre-
tation of numerous other UPC provisions. For example, the UPC antilapse
provisions closely mirror the delineation of the parent-child relation-
ship.221 It goes almost without saying that for a child to take under the
antilapse provision, courts will rely on the UPC's internal definitions of
parent or child in construing whether the antilapse provision may be in-
voked (i.e., if there are any children under the UPC definition who may
take under the will). 222
In sum, the 2008 UPC Amendments provide a series of technical rules
to define the parent-child relationship as it relates to adoption, ART, and
the implementation of (and reliance on) both statutes for class gift pur-
215. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-705(e)-(f) (2008).
216. Id. § 2-705(c)(1)-(2). An example of this section would be when H marries W, then H makes a
devise to H's uncles, but H has no uncles and W has five uncles. Therefore, based on section 2-
705(c)(1), H's class gift includes W's uncles.
217. Id. § 2-705(g).
218. Id. § 2-705(g)(1). An example of this section would be if H, in his will, devised $1,000 to H's
children, and H's wife is pregnant at H's death with child X. If child X lives 120 hours after he is
born, then he will be included in the class gift made by H.
219. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-705(g)(2) cmt. (2008) (stating that if the distribution date occurs
before or after the deceased parent's death, section 2-705(g)(2) does not apply).
220. Id. § 2-705(g)(3).
221. Id. § 2-603. In sum, antilapse provisions often may save devises in a will (or will-substitute) in
case the devisee has predeceased the testator. Subject to a few conditions, a child of the devisee may
take the parent's share under the will. See also Averill, supra note 30, at 920-21.
222. In light of the substantive changes made to the parent-child relationship and class gift provisions
of the UPC, the question arises whether the drafters of the 2008 UPC Amendments should have com-
mented on or revised the antilapse rules as well. Some ambiguity may continue to exist (and may be a
matter for courts to decide) regarding whether posthumously conceived children may take under an
antilapse statute.
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poses. The 2008 UPC Amendments are a good step in the direction of
expanding the definition of parent-child relationships for property succes-
sion purposes. Although overcomplicated and ideologically inconsistent in
certain places, the 2008 UPC Amendments do a valiant job in trying to
tackle complicated issues concerning stepfamilies and children born of
ART (less so with nontraditional families and blended families). The re-
mainder of this Article will evaluate the policy goals that are commonly
used to justify probate legal schemes and will analyze the new UPC
Amendments under those purported policy concerns.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE POLICY CONCERNS UNDERLYING THE UPC
A. The 2008 UPC Amendments' Effects on Public Policy
Having described in detail the 2008 UPC Amendments, this Article
now proceeds with a normative analysis of those Amendments from both
the intent-effectuating default rules perspective and a secondary, structural
perspective. The UPC does not disclose whether the 2008 UPC Amend-
ments were adopted to engender integration of shifting policies or merely
to attempt to clarify or correct earlier versions. Several apparent policy
contradictions and divergent effects on policy when applied under different
states' laws warrant further examination.
The 2008 UPC Amendments
retain] the sanguinary nexus definition of children based on blood
or a presumption thereof as the seminal building block for child
status, but expand[] the definition by including: (i) children of an
adjudicated legal parent; (ii) adopted children; (iii) a limited ex-
ception for step-parent and interfamily adopted children and chil-
dren adopted after both genetic parents have died; (iv) non-marital
children; (v) children born of ART where there is documented pa-
rental intent; (vi) children born of ART where there is functional
parenting; and (vii) equitably adopted children.223
In addition,
[t]he [2008 UPC Amendments] create0 one structure for defining
child status that advocates the sanguinary nexus test [and its reli-
ance on genetics as well as other structures] that disregard genetics
(intent to parent, functional parenting, behavioral parenting, and
223. Tritt, Sperms and Estates, supra note 9, at 407; see also UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-116-2-122
(2008). For good measure, there is also a behavioral aspect to defining parentage under section 2-114,
but behavioralism is only applied in a child-centered manner.
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contractual parenting). If intent to parent is important, why is it
ignored [for] genetic children that were accidentally conceived or
conceived through forced intercourse? If functionalism is impor-
tant, why do the statutes retain a genetics aspect-why not just im-
plement functionalism? For defining parentage, the 2008 UPC
Amendments at times rely upon legal parentage concepts and at
other times ignore it. Similarly, at times the UPC acknowledges
that a certain category of child may have multiple parents, and [at]
other times it seems to indicate that the greatest number of parents
a child could have is two. 224
B. Does it Effectuate Decedent's Intent?
As discussed, effectuating decedent's intent should be the primary goal
of default rules concerning succession laws. A critical problem and fatal
flaw of the 2008 UPC Amendments is the perspective from which the par-
ent-child test is to be applied. The 2008 UPC Amendments analyze the
parent-child relationship from a child-centered view, advocating a type of
fairness doctrine225 from the point of view of the child in creating succes-
sion law default rules. In essence, the 2008 UPC Amendments seem to be
based on family law jurisprudence by focusing on the child's wellbeing.
Despite this recognized difference in foundational underpinnings between
family law (the best interest of the child) and the law of succession (effec-
tuating decedent's intent), the presence of the child-centered family law
policy influence on the 2008 UPC Amendments is ubiquitous. While these
divergent policy views can often coexist in intestacy statutes while reach-
ing harmonious results, several of the 2008 UPC Amendments defining
the parent-child relationship clearly promote the best interests of the child
while ignoring contrary expressions of decedent's intent.
For example, under section 2-118(b), an individual who is "in the
process of being adopted by a married couple," but not yet legally adopted
when one of the adoptive spouses dies, can nonetheless inherit from that
deceased spouse.226 This result ostensibly effectuates the decedent's intent
because the decedent apparently intended to complete the adoption and
become a legal parent. However, because this scenario does not constitute
224. Tritt, Sperms and Estates, supra note 9, at 413-14.
225. See, e.g., Ralph C. Brashier, Children and Inheritance in the Nontraditional Family, 1996 UTAH
L. REV. 93, 94 n. 1 (1996) ("Although this Article does examine the adequacy of probate laws from a
standpoint of 'fairness' to the child in a nontraditional family, the Article is principally concerned with
incongruities and the overall lack of certainty presented by current inheritance schemes as applied to
such a child.").
226. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-118(b)(1) (2008). One additional requirement is that the decedent's
surviving spouse subsequently be granted the adoption. See id. § 2-118.
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an exception to the UPC's genetic parent foundation,227 the adoptee would
still be permitted to inherit from his or her genetic parents if either or both
died during the process of the adoption. The individual's ability to also
inherit from his or her genetic parents flies in the face of the genetic par-
ents' intent, which is clearly to sever all legal ties with the individual via
adoption. Thus, to be consistent, if an individual may inherit from a pro-
spective adoptive parent once the "process of being adopted" 2 8 has begun
on the basis of that adoptive parent's presumed intent, the individual
should similarly be barred from inheriting from his or her genetic parents.
Other examples where the Amendments frustrate decedent's intent ex-
tend from the UPC's heavy reliance on broadly allowing inheritance from
genetic parents. While the average decedent would probably like to pro-
vide for his or her genetic progeny under ordinary circumstances, it is a
stretch to conclude that genetic parents would choose to favor upon death,
above others important in their lives, a genetic child whom they never met
or never even knew existed. Similarly, genetic parents who have children
conceived by forcible intercourse or otherwise lack intent2 " to parent a
child may not wish to provide for such children upon death.
There is a tendency to think of intestate succession as a form of
child support, whether the child is a minor or an adult, or whether
the child is needy or financially successful. 230 Advocating [the best
interest of the child] rationale as the overarching concern of in-
heritance law, however, is rooted neither in the nature nor the his-
tory of inheritance law.
There is a fundamental difference between intestate succession and
child support, inasmuch as no parent is under a legal obligation to
leave his or her children anything, and there is no "right to in-
herit."231 In fact, the testamentary freedom doctrine values the
right of the testator to completely disinherit his or her adult chil-
dren.232
227. See id. § 2-117.
228. Id. § 2-118(b)(1).
229. See, e.g., Phillips v. Irons, 2005 WL 4694579 at *1 (111. App. Ct. 2005); Ferguson v. McKier-
nan, 855 A.2d 121, 122 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004).
230. See Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws, supra note 35 (basing her proposal on two policies: ap-
proximation of decedent's intent and support for families, however formed).
231. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER, supra note 28, at 62 (stating that the interest of an heir apparent is a
"mere expectancy" and is "not a legal 'interest' at all").
232. Tritt, Sperms and Estates, supra note 9, at 417-18; HernAndez, supra note 2; Friedman, supra
note 21, at 15 (theorizing that the ease in which an individual may disinherit his or her own children is
perhaps reflective of the respect American law has to the doctrine of testamentary freedom).
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In addition, succession law historically has, and continues to, provide
limited and narrow support to a decedent's child, and this meager support
is only offered to minor children.233 If society's need to protect children in
the inheritance context is of such monumental concern to infringe upon a
property owner's right to testamentary freedom, then this concern should
lead to the creation of a mandatory rule, not a default rule.
The 2008 UPC Amendments frustrate testamentary freedom in many
ways. Outside of the adoption context, the 2008 UPC Amendments main-
tain the historic UPC position that a child can have no more than two par-
ents for intestacy purposes. Even in the context of assisted reproduction
without a gestational carrier, the Amendments use the term "other parent"
to preclude the possibility of a child having more than two parents for
intestacy purposes. 234 This limitation excludes a variety of potential multi-
parent or blended familial structures made possible through use of assisted
reproduction, especially among gays and lesbians.235
Prior to the 2008 UPC Amendments, a child adopted by one genetic
parent's spouse, i.e., that child's stepparent, could inherit through and
from both genetic parents and the adoptive stepparent. 236 The 2008 UPC
Amendments retained this provision and added additional circumstances
under which an adoptive child can inherit from more than two parents.
Under the 2008 UPC Amendments, a child "in the process of being
adopted" by either a married couple or a stepparent can inherit, if one
adoptive spouse or the adoptive stepparent dies, from that deceased adop-
tive parent and both of that child's genetic parents. Additionally, under
section 2-119(c), a child can potentially inherit from up to four parents.238
Such is the case when a child is adopted by a married relative of a genetic
parent; the child can then inherit from or through both adoptive parents
and both genetic parents .239 Allowing a child to inherit from three or even
four parents in the adoption context is contradictory to the other parts of
the 2008 UPC Amendments, which consistently limit a child's ability to
inherit from a maximum of two parents.
The 2008 UPC Amendments yield mixed results for homosexual par-
ents when applied in various different states. In states that allow second-
parent adoptions, 21 the 2008 UPC Amendments prove harmful to the ex-
233. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-402, 2-402A (homestead allowance); 2-404 (maintenance
allowance); 2-403 (exempt property allowance) (2008).
234. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(f) (2008).
235. For example, the 2008 UPC Amendments would not allow a child to inherit from three parents
where a gay man donates sperm to a lesbian couple for assisted reproduction, and all three intend to
assume parental roles in the raising of the child.
236. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114 (amended 2008), 8 U.L.A. 91 (1998).
237. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-118(b)(l)-(2) (2008); see also supra Part II.A.2.
238. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-119(c) (2008).
239. See id. § 2-119(c).
240. See supra Part II.A.2.
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isting parental rights of homosexual couples where one is a genetic parent.
Were the nongenetic partner to adopt the child,2 41 the child would no
longer inherit from the genetic-parent partner under the 2008 UPC
Amendments, even if, for example, the partners were lesbians otherwise
deemed parents under section 2-120(f).242 This detrimental application to
homosexual parents is not, however, mirrored in the application of the
2008 UPC Amendments to states that prohibit gay adoption. The 2008
UPC Amendments, via sections 2-120 and 2-121, actually open the door
for inheritance by a child conceived by assisted reproduction through two
parents of the same sex. Using section 2-120(f) as an example, because it
uses words such as "individual" and "other parent" instead of "father" or
"spouse," a lesbian woman, other than the birth mother, who consented to
the assisted reproduction with intent to be treated as the child's other par-
ent, is a parent of that child under the UPC.243 Such recognition would
manifest a drastic shift in policy in states that do not allow gay marriage,
civil unions, or second-parent adoption.
Default rules of succession law should facilitate the effectuation of tes-
tator's intent and nothing else. Therefore,
[sluccession law is, and should be, [properly] focused on the prop-
erty owner.2 " If providing for one's child at death implements the
dispositive wishes of the average intestate decedent, fulfilling this
goal should be property owner centered rather than child-centered.
Defining a parent-child relationship from a best interest of a child
perspective does not achieve the traditional goals of inheritance
laws-the focus in succession law is on the property owner and not
on the expectations of surviving family members.245
Default rules of succession law should not favor any other policy to
the detriment of furthering testamentary freedom. If decedent's intent
means anything, it cannot be rendered secondary to other theories. Dece-
dent's intent is still viewed as the most important purpose of our testacy
laws; it is time that decedent's intent return as the primary purpose for
intestacy laws as well, both in theory and in practice.
241. Adoption of the child by the nongenetic partner may be desirable for a number of lifetime rea-
sons, including the ability to make medical decisions on the child's behalf, health insurance benefits
for the child, or other similar traditional parentage rights.
242. This result is a consequence of UPC section 2-119(e), which, in the context of a subsequent
adoption, treats individuals established as parents under UPC section 2-120(f) as genetic parents, from
whom adopted children generally cannot inherit.
243. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(f) (2008).
244. This Article does not debate whether child support obligations should survive a parent's death
and become a debt of the estate.
245. Tritt, Sperms and Estates, supra note 9, at 414-15. See also Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepfami-
lies in the Law of Inestate Succession and Wills, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 917, 939 (1989).
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C. Structural Goals of Succession Law Default Rules
Within the broader scope of the UPC's policy to effectuate decedent's
intent, there are narrower structural goals that underlie effective succes-
sion law default rules. Included in these structural goals are the principles
that succession law default rules should be administratively efficient; rigid
enough to provide a predictable outcome for courts, property owners, and
benefactors; easily understood by the general public; and flexible enough
to adapt to future developments. 246 This section analyzes whether the 2008
UPC Amendments satisfy these structural goals and whether they are suit-
able for adoption by states.
1. Ease of Administration
Ease of administration is a prized feature of succession default rules
and is a principle concern of American succession law. 247 "Even though [ I
succession laws may [ ] have [the] purpose" of effectuating testator's in-
tent, "the efficacy of such [purpose] may depend upon the ease with which
[the laws may] be administered." 2 48 The UPC states that one of its pur-
poses is "to promote a speedy and efficient system for liquidating the es-
tate of the decedent and making distribution to his successors."24 9 Ease of
administration, in itself, though, does not justify undermining respect for
effectuating testator's intent. 25 0
The 2008 UPC Amendments in Subpart 2 provide courts with specific
instructions regarding numerous parent-child possibilities. They also pro-
vide clear temporal cutoffs, such as the 120-hour requirement in section 2-
118(b)(2), the two-year requirement in section 2-120(f)(2)(A), and limiting
in sections 2-120(k) and 2-121(h) the time frame within which a posthu-
mously conceived child can be treated as an heir of the deceased genetic
parent. However, despite the clarifications of some issues, these Amend-
ments will likely plague courts with the same difficulties navigating
246. See Averill, supra note 30, at 913-14 (discussing the general need for "predictability, provabil-
ity, and correctness in result" in regard to the 1990 UPC).
247. Spitko, Expressive Function, supra note 60, at 1066 (listing "desire for simplicity and certainty"
among the "hierarchy of values upon which [the intestacy statutes in the UPC are] based."); see also
Spitko, Inheritance Rights for Unmarried Connitted Partners, supra note 89, at 285; Cristy G. Lo-
menzo, Note, A Goal-Based Approach to Drafting Intestacy Provisions for Heirs Other than Surviving
Spouses, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 941, 945 (1995); Tanya K. Herndndez, supra note 2, at 1016 ("Intestate
statutes preserve judicial economy by setting forth a predefined hierarchy of persons who qualify for
distribution."); Gaubatz, supra note 18, at 515 ("Simplicity in the administration of estates is an im-
portant goal both to society and to its members."); Lawrence W. Waggoner, Spousal Rights In Our
Multiple-Marriage Society: The Revised Uniform Probate Code, 26 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 683,
726-28 (1992) (explaining that the drafters of the UPC rejected equitable distribution as the basis for
the elective share, in part, because of the uncertainty and difficulty in administration).
248. See Gaubatz, supra note 18, at 514.
249. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-102(b)(3) (2008).
250. Gaubatz, supra note 18, at 534-35.
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through their complex structure and numerous variables that will severely
restrict the ability of individuals to understand and rely on the Amend-
ments as their distribution scheme.25 1
2. Predictability and Certainty
Like ease of administration, predictability is an important feature of
succession law.252 The predictability of the Amendments, too, represents
an important quality of a default rule.253 Professor Mary Ann Glendson has
discussed how discretion, which tends to be at odds with predictability,
operates in family law and succession law.254 She notes:
[G]ranting the necessity for a great deal of judicial discretion in
dealing with the economic and child-related effects of divorce, it is
important to recognize that this discretion need not be uncontrolled
and that significant predictability can be introduced into a discre-
tionary system. . . . [T]he fact that no two family situations are
identical does not mean that there are not regularly recurring fact
patterns that can and should be treated in the same way.255
Commentators diverge, however, as to whether inheritance law should
promote the application of a rigid default rule or, instead, a discretionary
standard. It is certainly true that as an inheritance rule becomes more
rigid, then the more comfortable estate planners, benefactors, and testators
will be with the predictability of outcomes in the probate court.256 In real
ity, if a decedent preferred discretion as a means of effectuating intent
rather than rigid standards, then the decedent's obvious preference would
be to draft a will. 257 In the context of the 2008 UPC Amendments, it is
clear that the Commissioners provided a checklist of parent-child relation-
251. See infra Part III.
252. Spitko, Expressive Function, supra note 60, at 1066. See also Mary Louise Fellows, Traveling
the Road of Probate Reform: Finding the Way to Your Will, 77 MINN. L. REv. 659, 660 (1993)
("[Two of the primary goals of probate reform are to reduce litigation and to facilitate estate planning
... ."); Paula A. Monopoli, "Deadbeat Dads": Should Support and Inheritance Be Linked?, 49 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 257, 292-96 (1994).
253. See Hirsch, Default Rules, supra note 1, at 1065-67; Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An
Economic Analysis, 42 DuKE L.J. 557, 605 (1992) (recognizing the relevance of risk aversion to the
preference for rules). See generally Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L.
REV. 577 (1988); Kaplow, supra; Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 HARV. L. REV.
940, 957 (1923) (discussing the predictability of rules in the commercial context); Alan Schwartz &
Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 601-05 (2003).
254. Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and Succession
Law, 60 TuL. L. REv. 1165 (1986).
255. Id. at 1170-71.
256. Applying the principle of predictability, "[r]isk averse benefactors will likewise want to know
with assurance the distributive consequences of their munificence." Hirsch, supra note 1, at 1066.
257. Id. at 1067.
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ships for the purpose of increasing the predictability of the parent-child
relationships that do not pass the sanguinary nexus test. This predictability
benefits both the courts and the parties involved.
Clarity issues and structural and stylistic complexities aside, the 2008
UPC Amendments appear to provide a rather comprehensive definition of
the parent-child relationship that should produce consistent outcomes. The
2008 UPC Amendments mark the Commissioners' attempt to "catch up"
to changing times. Changing family structures25 8 and emerging technolo-
gies influence the definition of "parentage" in law and society, but the
UPC had held firm to its formalistic ties to genetics and adoption for de-
fining a parent-child relationship .259 This reliance had become an increas-
ingly frustrating-and arguably arcane-legal tool to predict intestacy out-
comes in light of the diversity of family relationships extant in American
life. Therefore, in the 2008 UPC Amendments, the Commissioners mark-
edly redefine the parent-child relationship by increasing its scope, thereby
opening the door for some of those in untraditional familial relationships
to benefit from a more predictable set of rules governing parent-child
property succession.
Without the 2008 UPC Amendments, only parents and children who
passed the sanguinary nexus test or endured a legal adoption could be cer-
tain that their relationship would be recognized by intestacy law. 2 o But
now, however, the family whose child is born by ART can sift through the
checklist of parent-child relationships, find the provision that applies to
their method of ART, and decide with reasonable certainty that they do
not need a will to bequeath to their child. Alternatively, the family might
find that the rigid rules do not effectuate their intent, and as a result, they
can effectuate their wishes through a will. Obviously, the predictability of
the 2008 UPC Amendments makes the courts' review easier, too.
258. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
259. For a thorough analysis and history of parent-child relationships for property succession pur-
poses, as well as the call for a novel, functional approach to parent-child property succession, see
Tritt, Sperms and Estates, supra note 9.
260. A survey of UPC section 2-114 reveals that the Commissioners made no mention of children
born by ART nor the several other contingencies that come along with childbirth by ART, including
parents whose child is a product of their gametes, parents whose child is a product of one of the par-
ent's gametes but not the other, parents whose child was born to a gestational carrier, parents who
used ART and were divorced before, during, or after the pregnancy, and lastly, parents whose child
was born via ART after the death of one of the parents. But cf. V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 556
(N.J. 2000) ("[W]e should not be misled into thinking that any particular model of family life is the
only one that embodies 'family values.'. . . Those attributes may be found in biological families, step-
families, blended families, single parent families, foster families, families created by modern repro-
ductive technology, and in families made up of unmarried persons. . . . Moreover, our judicial system
has long acknowledged that 'courts are capable of dealing with the realities, not simply the legalities,
of relationships' and have adjusted the rights and duties of parties in relation to that reality. . . . [T]he
nuclear family of husband and wife and their offspring is not the only method by which a parent-child
relationship can be created.").
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One notable exception in the 2008 UPC Amendments that could fore-
seeably lead to inconsistent outcomes and thus undermine predictability is
the ambiguity surrounding the phrase "in the process of being adopted"
used in section 2-118.261 The ability of a child to inherit from his or her
future adoptive parent turns on whether that child was "in the process of
being adopted" when that parent died.262 This phrase is not defined by the
UPC and appears to be open to court interpretation. Because this phrase
could conceivably cover a number of different factual situations,263 courts
will likely reach inconsistent outcomes in this area. Additionally, as new
reproductive technologies and new familial structures emerge that are not
specifically addressed by the 2008 UPC Amendments, outcomes in pro-
bate courts will likely become increasingly less predictable.
In sum, the stiff nature of the rules provides clarity where untradi-
tional parent-child relationships fall under the Amendments' categories of
parent-child. This aspect of the 2008 UPC Amendments is laudable,2 6
especially when compared to the minimalist approach taken by the previ-
ous UPC section 2-114. In addition, by enhancing the predictability of the
parent-child relationships, the 2008 UPC Amendments further the over-
arching policy goal of effectuating testamentary intent.265 Under the 2008
UPC Amendments, members of an untraditional family who want to carry
out their testamentary wishes need not resort to effectuating a will merely
because they could not predict court outcomes in this area under the previ-
ous UPC section 2-114.
3. Is it Understandable to Members of the General Public?
Because citizens may choose whether to bequeath their property by
will or to allow intestacy statutes to control its distribution, the intestacy
statutes must be sufficiently clear to enable an informed decision to be
made. If written in a confusing or deceiving manner, these statutes would
potentially frustrate the distributive intent of every decedent who had erro-
neously relied on their terms. While the 2008 UPC Amendments defining
the parent-child relationship are substantive improvements in clarity, their
textual and structural arrangement leaves much to be desired.
261. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-118(b) (2008).
262. Id.
263. As examples, "in the process of being adopted" could include any number of factual situations
prior to receiving an order of adoption, including: the filing of adoption paperwork, the future adop-
tive parents' temporary custody of the child, the commencement or completion of the pre-adoption
screening process by an adoption agency or social service investigator, or even the exhibition of ex-
pressions of intent to adopt by the future adoptive parents.
264. See Spitko, Inheritance Rights for Unmarried Committed Partners, supra note 89, at 284-87.
265. See generally Mark L. Ascher, The 1990 Uniform Probate Code: Older and Better, or More like
the Internal Revenue Code?, 77 MINN. L. REv. 639, 641 (1993).
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Substantively, the 2008 UPC Amendments improve clarity by specifi-
cally addressing numerous scenarios that were ambiguous or not addressed
under the prior UPC version, and by reflecting the societal shift away
from the traditional nuclear family due to both scientific advances in ART
and individual choices in family structure. For example, the 2008 UPC
Amendments expand on and clarify the rights of children (i) adopted by a
stepparent; 266 (ii) adopted by a relative or spouse or surviving spouse of a
relative;267 or (iii) adopted after the death of both genetic parents2'8 to in-
herit from or through the biological parent who either is deceased or has
given up parental rights. 269 As another example, " [tjhe 2008 UPC
Amendments divide the definition of a parent-child relationship for chil-
dren conceived by ART into two sections."270 The first section2' "deals
with children born other than to a gestational mother (i.e., where the birth
mother is either the genetic parent or intended parent)," 272 and the second
section27 "deals with children born to a gestational mother (i.e., where the
birth mother is someone who is not the intended parent or genetic parent
but who gives birth to a child under a gestational agreement). "274 By
breaking down the numerous possibilities of parent and child rules under
different adoption scenarios and under the numerous forms of ART that
are currently in use, the 2008 Amendments allow individuals occupying
these various roles to more accurately understand the intestate distribution
of their property should they choose to allow some or all of it to fall to
intestacy.
Structurally and stylistically, however, the 2008 UPC Amendments
prove to be complicated and confusing to the average reader. The added
complexities of the 2008 UPC Amendments can be divided into two types:
(1) the textual complexity, and (2) the interdisciplinary complexity be-
tween the UPC and other bodies of law-namely, family law.
266. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-119(b) (2008). "For example, consider if a child's biological married
parents divorced. If the child's mother remarries and the child's new step-father adopts the child, the
UPC allows the child to not only inherit from his or her mother and newly adopted father, but also
from and through his biological father." Tritt, Sperms and Estates, supra note 9, at 410 n.313.
267. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-119(c) (2008). The UPC defines "relative" as a grandparent or de-
scendant of the grandparent, which would include, for example, the child's aunts and uncles. See id.
§ 2-115.
268. Id. § 2-119(d).
269. "Note, however, that the genetic parent who is no longer legal parent, and the genetic parent's
family, will not be able to inherit from or through the child. This lack of reciprocity demonstrates the
child-centered nature of the 2008 UPC Amendments." Tritt, Sperms and Estates, supra note 9, at 410
n.316.
270. Id. at 411.
271. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120 (2008).
272. Tritt, Sperms and Estates, supra note 9, at 411.
273. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-121 (2008).
274. Tritt, Sperms and Estates, supra note 9, at 411.
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i. Textual Complexity
It is important that a default rule be easily understood by those to
which the law applies. 7 Indeed, if people have to consult a lawyer to de-
cipher the text of an intestacy statute, then the default has failed because
"[o]nce the client has borne the expense of a conference to establish the
relevant data, the further expense of drafting (versus abstaining from
drafting) becomes marginal, hence robbing the default rule of its potential
for transaction-cost efficiency." 276 Even a simple glance at the 2008 UPC
Amendments, instead, reveals their complexity.
The first feature a reader of the 2008 UPC Amendments to Subpart 2,
entitled "Parent-Child Relationship," will notice is that they are consid-
erably longer than their pre-2008 counterparts. In fact, the 2008 UPC
Amendments expand the parent-child relationship statutes from one sec-
tion and its three subsections to nine sections with nine definitions and
twenty-eight subsections. 277 These sections and subsections burden the
reader with excessive legalistic language and numerous cross-references,
conditions, variables, and exceptions .27' This shift in quantity comes at the
cost of simplicity and understandability .279 The Commissioners noted that
the restriction of the categories of intestate beneficiaries makes it easier to
prove heirship.280 Once a person has finally finished reading through the
2008 UPC Amendments, that person then faces the equally daunting task
of decoding the cross-references found throughout the 2008 UPC Amend-
ments.2 81 In practical terms, a person needs a strong attention span to read
275. See Ayres & Gernet, supra note 50, at 99; Hirsch, Default Rules, supra note 1, at 1062-64. See
generally Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, 11 J.L. EcON. & ORG.
150 (1995) (addressing the problem from the perspective of mandatory rules); Clayton P. Gillette,
Cooperation and Convention in Contractual Defaults, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 167, 183-84 (1993)
(suggesting that complexity increases error costs, i.e., the risk that a default rule will be misapplied);
JANET FINCH ET AL., WILLS, INHERITANCE, AND FAMILIES 4 (1996); Gary, Parent-Child Relation-
ship, supra note 87, at 653.
276. See Hirsch, Default Rules, supra note 1, at 1064.
277. Compare UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114 (2004) with UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-114-2-122
(2008).
278. See generally UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-115-2-121 (2008).
279. An illustrative example of this complexity is section 2-120(f), which conditions the application of
its rule with numerous cross-references by beginning: "le]xcept as otherwise provided in subsections
(g), (i), and (j), and unless a parent-child relationship is established under subsection (d) or (e) . . . ."
Id. § 2-120(f). Notwithstanding the complexity of applying the multiple subparts of section 2-120(f), it
clearly becomes quite a chore for the average citizen to examine all of the other cross-referenced
sections to determine whether section 2-120(f) might even apply to that person's parent-child relation-
ship.
280. UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. II, pt. 1, cmt. (amended 2008); 8 U.L.A. 271 (1998) (pre-1990
version of article II).
281. For example, UPC sections 2-116-2-121 each provide exceptions that require cross-referencing
throughout the entirety of the Amendments. And on top of all that, the legislative note to UPC section
2-115 include references to two sections of the Uniform Parentage Act (2000), as amended.
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through the 2008 UPC Amendments and then reread them to understand
the numerous cross-references.
Even more glaring in complexity to the average reader than the quan-
tity of 2008 UPC Amendments and their cross-references, however, is the
scientific terminology in the 2008 UPC Amendments. For example, in
UPC section 2-121(h) readers are required to determine when a
"[p]osthumously [c]onceived [g]estational [c]hild"282 is treated as in "ges-
tation." In that same subsection, one of the sub-subsections include that a
posthumously conceived gestational child is treated as in gestation if the
child is "in utero not later than 36 months after the individual's death."283
Unfortunately, the definition section to UPC section 2-121 fails to define
the terms "in utero" or "gestation." 284 "Gestation" is "the carrying of an
embryo or fetus inside a female viviparous animal." 285 In addition, "in
utero" is defined as "occurring or residing within the uterus or womb;
unborn." 28 6 It becomes clear that, even with a dictionary and encyclopedia,
one reading the Amendments may need to consult a doctor and a lawyer to
even understand the terms used. This complication, however, is not lim-
ited to the text of the 2008 UPC Amendments. The legislative note at the
end of UPC section 2-120 suggests that states should enact a provision
requiring "genetic depositories" to provide a consent form to depositors.2 87
Yet the 2008 UPC Amendments fail to define the term "genetic deposi-
tory," leaving courts and citizens alike guessing as to its precise meaning.
In sum, the 2008 UPC Amendments use very sophisticated language with-
out providing the reader with adequate explanation.
One structurally misleading mistake28 8 is found in the title of section 2-
117. While this section defines the underlying foundation of the UPC's
parent-child relationship as being between a child and that child's genetic
parents (subject to exceptions), the title focuses exclusively on the sec-
tion's assertion that no distinction is made based on the parents' marital
status. Thus, it is impossible for a reader to rely on the titles to locate the
general rule behind identifying the default parent-child relationship.
282. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-121(h) (2008).
283. Id. § 2-121(h)(1).
284. Id. § 2-121(a). A glance at the definitions reveals complexity and confusion. For example, the
definition of a "Gestational child" is "a child born to a gestational carrier under a gestational agree-
ment." Id. § 2-121(a)(3). Indeed, there are definitions of "Gestational agreement" and "Gestational
carrier," however, they are equally as confusing and fail to clarify for those who may not know what
gestation means.
285. Wikipedia, Gestation, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gestation (last visited Jan. 12, 2010).
286. Wiktionary, In Utero, http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/in utero (last visited Jan. 12, 2010).
287. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120 cmt. (2008).
288. As Paul "Bear" Bryant said, "'[wihen you make a mistake, there are only three things you
should ever do about it: admit it; learn from it; and don't repeat it.'" CREED KING & HEIDI TYLINE
KING, I AIN'T NEVER BEEN NOTHING BUT A WINNER 98 (2000).
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Additionally, Subpart 2 begins with a section of definitions of terms
applicable to the entire subpart. 28 9 Then, however, several individual sec-
tions within Subpart 2 begin with additional definitions of terms. 29 The
problem here lies in the fact that these terms defined within later sections
are used in additional sections, including use in sections before the sec-
tions in which they are defined. For example, three sections29' discuss the
term "gestational child" before it is eventually defined in section 2-121.
Two easy measures could be taken to ameliorate this problem. Because the
two adoption sections2 discuss "child[ren] of assisted reproduction" and
"gestational child[ren]" several times, these sections could come after the
assisted reproduction and gestational carrier sections.293 Thus, the sections
should follow a rational order based on subject matter and their depend-
ence on one another, an order such as: (i) Child Born to Gestational Car-
rier, (ii) Child Conceived by Assisted Reproduction Other than Child Born
to Gestational Carrier, (iii) Adoptee and Adoptee's Adoptive Parent or
Parents, and (iv) Adoptee and Adoptee's Genetic Parents. The other prac-
tical and logical solution to this problem would be to place all definitions
in the initial "Definitions" section;' indeed it appears that because the
definitions are mutually exclusive, there is no need to limit their applica-
tion to individual sections.
ii. The Duplication of Complexity in Family and Inheritance
Law
One further source of potential confusion to average citizens is that
their states' family-law determination of who is a "parent" may conflict
with the 2008 UPC Amendments' definition of the parent-child relation-
ship for intestacy purposes. Curiously, Subpart 2 defines "genetic father"
as the man with whom the father-child relationship is established "under
the presumption of paternity" under applicable state law, 295 instead of sim-
ply as determined under state law. Ostensibly, a man may be deemed a
child's father under state law, yet not meet a presumption of paternity and
thus not be that child's father for intestacy purposes. This creates an obvi-
ous source of confusion to someone who, for instance, has been adjudi-
289. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-115 (2008).
290. See, e.g., id. §§ 2-120, 2-121.
291. Id. §§ 2-118-2-120.
292. Id. §§ 2-118, 2-119.
293. Id. §§ 2-120 and 2-121, respectively. The adoption sections probably come first because of
adoption's historic place in the UPC. The assisted reproduction and gestational carrier sections proba-
bly follow afterwards because they were just recently added as part of the 2008 UPC Amendments to
the UPC.
294. Id. § 2-115.
295. Id. § 2-115(5).
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cated as the father for family law purposes yet whose "child" might not
inherit from him should he die intestate.296
In Shondel J. v. Mark D., for example, Shondel J_ and Mark D. were
involved in a sexual relationship while living in the country of Guyana
during the spring of 1995.297 The next January, Shondel gave birth to a
daughter and listed Mark as the father. 298 At the time of the birth, Mark
was living in New York.299 Upon finding out about the birth, Mark de-
clared in a sworn statement, notarized by the Guyana General-Counsel,
that he was convinced that he was the child's father.30 In the same state-
ment, Mark explicitly acknowledged his paternal responsibilities, includ-
ing child support.30 1 Mark began providing financial support to the child,
visited the child in 1996, listed the child as his daughter and primary bene-
ficiary on his life insurance policy, and sent regular child support pay-
ments until 1999.302 Because the child support payments became less fre-
quent, Shondel filed an action in 2000 seeking orders of filiation and sup-
port.303 Mark eventually requested a DNA test, which showed that he was
not the child's father."* Agreeing with the family court, the Court of Ap-
peals of New York found that even though Mark was not the child's ge-
netic father, he was estopped from denying his paternity because the child
had come to rely on him as her father to her detriment.305 Should these
facts not satisfy the presumption of paternity under state law, the child,
though adjudicated the child of Mark D., would not inherit from Mark D.
under the 2008 UPC Amendments.306 Such a result would be counterintui-
tive to members of the general public, who in all likelihood assume that a
court determination of parenthood is binding for all legal purposes, includ-
ing inheritance.
In addition, if another set of statutes already had the substance of the
Amendments included in that set of statutes' definition of parent-child,
why should the UPC not simply refer to the other set of statutes' definition
of parent-child?07 Without that reference, the cost to the Amendments'
simplicity remains; however, the marginal benefit of the Amendments is
limited only to the differences between the Amendments and the other set
of statutes. If that difference in the parent-child definition is minute-as is
296. See, e.g., Shondel J. v. Mark D., 853 N.E.2d 610 (N.Y. 2006).






303. Id. at 612.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 614-16.
306. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-115(5)-(7), 2-117 (2008).
307. See Gary, We Are Family, supra note 60, at 173.
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the difference between the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) and the Amend-
ments-then the Commissioners fail to strike the correct balance.
a. Background of the Interaction Between Family Law
and Inheritance Law
Since 1973, the UPA has maintained a complete set of rules for de-
termining the legal parents308 of a child for purposes of child welfare and
to assist child support.309 The UPA addresses the gamut of possible par-
ent-child relationships, and its definitions have been revised to meet both
traditional and modern family structures.310 Accordingly, under the 1990
UPC, the definition of parent-child referred to state law partially based on
the UPA's definition.3 1'
Since 1973, the UPA has defined the parent-child relationship with the
objective of providing clear rules for the benefit of children.312 A mother
under the UPA, as amended in 2002, includes a woman who gives birth to
the child, a woman who is adjudicated to be the mother, a woman who
adopts the child, and a woman who is the legal mother via a gestational
agreement."' Likewise, the UPA's definition of a legal father includes an
unrebutted presumed father, a man who acknowledges paternity, a man
adjudicated to be the father, a man who adopts the child, a man who con-
sents to be the legal father by means of assisted reproduction, and a man
who is the legal father under a gestational agreement.314 Accordingly, for
almost twenty years, the UPC has deferred to state law, partially based on
the UPA,"' for the definition of parent-child.1 6 The 2008 UPC Amend-
ments, however, mark a shift in the UPC's reliance on the UPA.
The UPA, indeed, makes a valiant effort to evolve317 its definition of
the parent-child relationship to evolving social norms.318 Accordingly, the
308. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 102(14) (2002).
309. See Unif. Parentage Act Summary, http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact-summaries
/uniformacts-s-upa.asp (last visited Jan. 12, 2010) [hereinafter UPA Summary].
310. See id.
311. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114(a) (amended 2008) ("The parent and child relationship may
be established under [the Uniform Parentage Act] [applicable state law] [insert appropriate statutory
reference].").
312. For example, these rules provide for the mandate of child support. See UPA Summary, supra
note 309.
313. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201(a) (2002). See also UPA Summary, supra note 309.
314. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201(b) (2002). See also UPA Summary, supra note 309.
315. "To provide states with clear guidelines about determining parentage under a variety of circum-
stances, addressing the issues surrounding paternity and the challenges created by assisted reproduc-
tion, the Uniform Law Commission developed the UPA." Gary, We Are Family, supra note 55, at
174.
316. See supra note 301 and accompanying text.
317. Aside from the UPA, the Uniform Law Commission (ULC) promulgated the Uniform Status of
Children of Assisted Conception Act (1988) and the Uniform Putative and Unknown Fathers Act
(1988). By means of incorporation, the 2002 UPA incorporates the substance of these two earlier acts.
See UPA Summary, supra note 309.
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relevant questions arise as to: (1) what are the differences between the
2008 UPC Amendments' definition of parent-child and the UPA's defini-
tion, and (2) whether the UPC would account for those differences as ex-
ceptions, at a lower cost to the UPC's simplicity, had the UPC merely
referred to family law for the definition of parent-child.3 9
b. The Differences Between the UPA and the 2008 UPC
Amendments
The differences between the UPA and the 2008 UPC Amendments'
definitions of parent-child are minimal. Accordingly, the question that
must be raised is whether, because of the differences between the
Amendments and the UPA's definition of parent-child, the UPC could
have merely referred to the UPA's definition and provided exceptions
where necessary, rather than promulgating the extensive 2008 UPC
Amendments.
The first set of differences arises as exceptions to the general rule that,
following adoption, a child no longer inherits from his genetic parents.320
Carried over from the UPC as it was prior to the 2008 UPC Amendments,
the first difference is that when a stepparent adopts a child, that child can
inherit from a genetic parent despite the fact that the genetic parent is no
longer the legal parent (under the UPA).321 The second, related, difference
is that a child can inherit through his genetic parents if the adoption occurs
after the death of both genetic parents.322 In addition, the third and final
exception is that a child continues to inherit from the genetic parents
where the child has been adopted by a "relative"3 23 or by a surviving
spouse of a "relative." 324
318. The UPA Summary provides that "[t]echnology has changed the combinations and permutations
of the parent-child relationship, and the new Uniform Act simply reflects that fact," and concludes
that "[tihe new Uniform Parentage Act confronts the complicated issue of establishing legal parentage
against the complications that technology provides." UPA Summary, supra note 309.
319. This idea already has some support. As Gary points out:
In some respects the UPC, as modified by the UPC Amendments, mirrors the UPA, and in
others it differs from the UPA. In the areas in which the UPA and the UPC reach the same
result, perhaps it would make sense to have the UPC simply incorporate state law (the UPA
or other state law). The UPC could define a parent for intestacy purposes as a "legal par-
ent." Then, when different rules are needed because of the different purposes of the UPA
and the UPC, those rules can be exceptions to the underlying concept of legal parentage.
The reason for specific provisions in the UPC would be in situations in which the UPC
needed to create exceptions or additions to the definition of the parent-child relationship
created under the UPA.
Gary, We Are Family, supra note 60, at 175 (internal citations omitted).
320. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114(b) (amended 2008).
321. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-119(b) (2008).
322. Id. § 2-119(d).
323. Id. § 2-115(9).
324. Id. § 2-119(c).
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Moving the focus to the (hopeful) adopting parents, the second set of
differences arises when a person dies while "in the process of"3 25 adopting
a child. Although the deceased would never be the legal parent under the
UPA or 1990 UPC, under the 2008 UPC Amendments a child may inherit
through the deceased who was "in the process of' adopting the child if the
deceased was married and the deceased's surviving spouse completes the
adoption,3 26 or if the deceased was a stepparent and the deceased's spouse
(the adoptive legal parent) survives the stepparent by 120 hours.327
Considering the abovementioned distinctions between the UPC and
UPA's definitions of family, it is clear that the UPC could avoid the 2008
UPC Amendments' added complexity by merely referring to the UPA's
definition, in addition to providing a few exceptions.3 28 Additionally, by
duplicating only parts of the UPA's definition of family, the UPC's failure
to duplicate everything in the UPA suggests implicitly that the UPC does
not endorse that which it did not duplicate. This is another way that the
added complexity can lead to irrational results.
4. Flexibility
Although the 2008 UPC Amendments can be praised for their rigid
predictability, questions arise as to whether the 2008 UPC Amendments'
unbending definition of parent-child, structurally speaking, can withstand
the test of time.329 Intestacy laws must be flexible enough to accommodate
the lives and familial situations of all members of society and be adaptable
to future changes to avoid being rendered outdated or inapplicable.
The 2008 UPC Amendments' narrow focus on legal adoption and
children conceived by ART precludes other common, but untradi-
tional, family structures found in the United States. For instance,
many individuals cannot afford marriage, divorce, or legal adop-
tion (or, an individual might distrust the legal system). Neverthe-
325. Id. § 2-118(b)(1). Without a definition of "in the process of," the only hint the Commissioners
provide as to the meaning of that term is that it is not limited to the filing of legal process. Id. § 2-
118(b)(1), cmt. Comments appear in the 2008 Annual Meeting draft.
326. Id. § 2-118(b)(1).
327. Id. § 2-118(b)(2).
328. Because some terminology is different between the UPC and UPA, one cannot be certain that the
distinctions listed in this Article are exhaustive. However, they are the most glaring.
329. Opining on this same discussion of flexibility, it seems that the substance of the 2008 UPC
Amendments fails the flexibility test:
The 2008 UPC Amendments' narrow focus on legal adoption and children conceived by
ART precludes other common, but untraditional, family structures found in the United
States. For instance, many individuals cannot afford marriage, divorce, or legal adoption
(or, an individual might distrust the legal system). Nevertheless, these individuals may be
part of a blended family that raise and treat non-genetic children as their own.
Tritt, Sperms and Estates, supra note 9, at 420 (internal citations omitted); see also Gary, We Are
Family, supra note 60, at 175-76.
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less, these individuals may be part of a blended family that raise
and treat non-genetic children as their own [and would intend to
pass property to these children upon death.] 330
For instance, as homosexual couples become more socially accepted
and legally recognized as parents for the family unit, to effectuate dece-
dent's intent, intestacy statutes must provide for inheritance by children
through two male or two female parents.
The recent [2008] UPC [A]mendments still do not adequately ad-
dress the emerging issue of second-parent adoptions by gay and
lesbian couples and the interplay with state marriage or partner-
ship laws. Amended UPC §§ 2-705 and 2-118-19 limit the right of
adopted children to [inherit] from their genetic parents. The previ-
ous UPC rule merely prohibited adopted children from inheriting
from their natural parents. The new rules, codified at § [sic] 2-118
and 2-119, refer only to the rights of adoptees to inherit from a
genetic parent in limited cases where the genetic parent's spouse is
adopting the adoptee. In states where [same sex] marriage is not
recognized, the [2008] UPC [A]mendment[s] would seem to limit
the child from [inheriting] from one of her parents. For example,
if the genetic mother in a lesbian couple wishes her. partner to
adopt the child, the genetic mother risks her child being unable to
inherit from the genetic mother because this scenario does not fit
one of the exceptions to the [sic] 2-119 (a) severing the parent-
child relationship between an adoptee and the adoptee's genetic
parents."
[As another] example, a couple might not be able to afford a di-
vorce. The wife could leave the husband with their infant children
and begin another relationship with her new partner who would
330. Tritt, Sperms and Estates, supra note 9, at 420 (internal citations omitted). "These individuals
might be more likely than others to die intestate, but are overlooked in intestacy statutes." Id. at 420
n.367.
For example, a couple might not be able to afford a divorce. The wife could leave the hus-
band with their infant children and begin another relationship with her new partner who
would also raise and support the wife's children. Or, a wife might have an affair and be-
come pregnant. The genetic father of the child may not relinquish parental rights, but the
wife's husband may nevertheless raise and support the child as his own. It goes without
saying that there are many examples of non-traditional family structures that are ignored by
the language of the new statutes. See also Nancy E. Dowd, Multiple Parents/Multiple Fa-
thers, 9 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 231, 236 (2007) (describing how male parenting patterns dif-
fer from female patterns, including how men parent "serially" based on the person with
whom they share their household).
Id. at 420 n.368.
331. Id. at 409 n. 309. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-118 cmt. (2008).
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also raise and support the wife's children. Or, a wife might have
an affair and become pregnant. The genetic father of the child may
not relinquish parental rights, but the wife's husband may never-
theless raise and support the child as his own. It goes without say-
ing that there are many examples of non-traditional family struc-
tures that are ignored by the language of the new statutes.332
Accordingly, even putting the evolving technology of the 2008 UPC
Amendments aside, there remains a lack of flexibility even for plausible
family scenarios.33
The 2008 UPC Amendments attempt to cover with specificity, using
complicated codified variables, the possible parent-child scenarios that
could result from existing methods of ART.334 "[These] codified variables
are inextricably linked to the development of ART. As ART is constantly
evolving, the codified [2008 UPC Amendments'] variables will fast be-
come antiquated."' The 2008 UPC Amendments' new recognition of
current technology may even become outdated before becoming effective
by states.336 The legislative process is slow in nature compared with the
corresponding effects of the technical novelty of the 2008 UPC Amend-
ments.3 Because the 2008 UPC Amendments provide little flexibility for
quickly evolving technology,338 their rigidity in the area of ART seems
misplaced.339 As new methods of ART emerge, courts will struggle to fit
them into the 2008 UPC Amendments' specific provisions. Such undertak-
ings will unduly burden courts and likely result in inconsistent outcomes.
Ultimately, ART advances will necessitate the frequent modification of the
2008 UPC Amendments, or, more likely, the development of new stan-
dards that are general and flexible enough to extend their applicability to
any new developments and advances in the field of ART.340
332. Tritt, Sperms and Estates, supra note 9, at 409 n.368 (citing Dowd, supra note 330, at 236).
333. Admittedly, untraditional parent-child relationships that fail to follow the formalities (marriage,
adoption, divorce) would face the same problems under the UPA as they do in the UPC. Put another
way, flexibility would still be a concern for these families under the suggested approach of referring to
the UPA's definition of parent-child.
334. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-120-2-121 (2008).
335. Tritt, Sperms and Estates, supra note 9, at 421. See Kristine S. Knaplund, Postmortem Concep-
tion and a Father's Last Will, 46 ARIz. L. REV. 91, 99 (2004) ("discussing technology, such as artifi-
cial wombs and frozen stem cells, that can be used to produce eggs or sperms and cloning," Tritt,
Sperms and Estates, supra note 9, at 421 n.369).
336. Tritt, Sperms and Estates, supra note 9, at 421. See also Gary, We Are Family, supra note 60,
at 175-76.
337. As part of Professor Tritt's call for a functional approach to inheritance laws, he notes that
"[sipecific and explicit multi-faceted tests in a field involving ever-shifting technological variables
break easily when technology evolves." Tritt, Sperms and Estates, supra note 9, at 421.
338. See Knaplund, supra note 335.
339. "A brittle rubric is doomed to quickly shatter and to become obsolete." Tritt, Sperms and Es-
tates, supra note 9, at 421.
340. Many states do not allow surrogacy arrangements-these states have either declared surrogacy
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If the Commissioners had merely referred to the UPA for the defini-
tion of parent-child while providing a few exceptions, then the UPC's
definition of parent-child would not have the same flexibility concerns. As
Gary aptly points out, "[i]f one statute rather than multiple statutes ad-
dresses the issues of determining parentage of children created using as-
sisted reproduction, adopting states will need to change only one statute
when statutory change becomes necessary due to technological ad-
vances." 341
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE ADOPTION OF THE UPC
AMENDMENTS
A. State Legislatures
Some states have already begun the process of considering and adopt-
ing the 2008 UPC Amendments.3 42 As discussed above, the 2008 UPC
arrangements illegal per se or have declared the contracts unenforceable. See Ashley E. Bashur,
Whose Baby is it Anyway? The Current and Future Status of Surrogacy Contracts in Maryland, 38 U.
BALT. L. REV. 165, 193-94 & n.224 (2008). For these states, if the UPC revisions are adopted as-is,
then the UPC would legally recognize a form of parent-child relationship for inheritance purposes that
the state has already declared illegal for parentage or family law purposes. The internal cohesiveness
between succession, property, and family laws within a state would be at risk-aside from the issues of
statutory interpretation that arise from conflicting state laws.
States that do allow surrogacy contracts often have restrictions on who may become a surro-
gate mother and further whether she may be compensated. Id. at 197-200. Moreover, state laws vary
widely regarding whether the genetic parents (or the parents contracting with the surrogate, if not the
egg and sperm donors) must adopt the child after delivery. Id. at 171-73. Some states issue prebirth
orders designating the proper parents to be listed on the child's birth certificate. See, e.g., Liz Maples,
Casey Surrogate Baby Case Takes Another Twist, ADVOC.-MESSENGER, Oct. 27, 2005, available at
http://reproductivelawyer.com/press-casey.cfm (last visited Jan. 12, 2010) (discussing a groundbreak-
ing Massachusetts case where the contracting parents requested a court order enjoining that their
names be placed on the child's birth certificate, rather than the surrogate mother's name (the presumed
mother under Massachusetts law)); Lawrence A. Kalikow, Surrogacy and the Lw of Pennsylvania,
PENNSYLVANIA SURROGACY, March 2009, http://www.pasurrogacy.com/Surrogacyand the
Law.html (relying on J.F. v. D.B. to conclude that Pennsylvania allows issuance of prebirth orders to
name the contracting parents on the birth certificate and alleviating the need for postbirth adoption of
the child). Other states, such as California, analyze which mother intended to have the child and raise
it as her own when determining whom to place on the birth certificate, generally finding that the sur-
rogate is not the legal mother of the child. See Bashur, supra, at 168-69 (surveying state laws on
surrogacy, including a review of California surrogacy standards in Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776
(Cal. 1993)).
On the other hand, many states require postbirth adoption by the parents who contracted with
the surrogate, particularly if the parents are not the genetic sperm or egg donors. Id. at 171-73. In this
case, the UPC revisions would be superfluous because the child's right to inherit through the parent-
child relationship would already be recognized under the adoption provisions of the UPC. In sum,
many of the UPC's ART sections seem superfluous at best because they are already addressed by other
areas of state law. At worst, these revisions conflict with current state laws and provide confusing and
unnecessarily technical language sure to mire the most diligent probate court judge in questions of
scientific technology, statutory interpretation, and legislative intent.
341. Gary, We Are Family, supra note 60, at 175-76.
342. To date, both Colorado and Minnesota have introduced bills proposing adoption of the 2008
UPC Amendments. H.B. 09-1287 (Colo. 2009); H.F. 1228 (Minn. 2009); S.F. 369 (Minn. 2009).
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Amendments create serious concerns with regard to adoptions, class gift
designations in wills, and the definitions of parents and children. Regard-
less of these concerns, when considering adoption of the 2008 Amend-
ments, legislatures should consider that the parent-child relationship
amendments represent a change to the entire testacy and intestacy schemes
and may conflict with the state's family law definition of a parent-child
relationship, so that a la carte adoption of some provisions and rejection
of others may create "loopholes" within succession law and other aspects
of state law.
States might want to consider rejecting UPC section 2-116 or modify-
ing it to rely on the UPA's definition of child simply to avoid confusing
the public.343 Section 2-116 states that so long as a parent-child relation-
ship is determined to exist, notwithstanding the section 2-119 exceptions,
the child can inherit from the parent and the parent from the child.3" This
Amendment is hardly controversial, and it simply lays the ground rules for
the remainder of Subpart 2. Therefore, states that choose to adopt other
portions of Subpart 2 are strongly encouraged to adopt section 2-116.
At first glance, section 2-117 also seems noncontroversial, and its ac-
tual language is not offensive. The provision merely states that "a parent-
child relationship exists . . . regardless of the parents' marital status." **
Of greater concern is what section 2-117 removes from the 1990 UPC-in
the 1990 version, the UPC allowed the parent-child relationship to be es-
tablished under the UPA or relevant state law.346 Instead, the UPC pro-
poses its own definition of the parent-child relationship-one that is so
complex, it requires several sections to replace the former section 2-114.
Because section 2-117 promotes technicality at the expense of effi-
ciency and simplicity, legislatures might consider relying on the UPA or
other governing state law concerning parentage. This will prevent a dis-
connect between probate laws and other areas of state law.347 This discon-
nect reduces efficiency and risks not effectuating the decedent's wishes-if
a decedent believed a child was his or her own based on the ruling of a
family court, the reasonable person would have no notice that probate laws
343. Further, as stated supra, the definition of parent as endorsed by the UPA is different from that
of the new UPC. This may create serious confusion among individuals who may be under the mistaken
impression that because the individual was adjudicated to be a parent under state law for family law
purposes, they may assume taking under the intestacy scheme. Families may not even be aware of the
disconnect in their state laws until probate proceedings, when it is too late to remedy the issue.
344. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-116 (2008).
345. Id. § 2-117.
346. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §2-114 (amended 2008).
347. Though reliance on family law or other state law principles may have its pitfalls (and may not
fully reflect testator's intent), when given the all-or-nothing scenario of the 2008 UPC section 2-116 or
nothing, it would be better to reject the amendment and rely on other state laws. Moreover, reliance
on state laws for the parent-child relationship will undermine uniformity of probate laws (to the extent
that states have not adopted the UPA), but in this case uniformity should be sacrificed in the name of
simplicity and clarity.
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differ in their definitions of "child." Further, while reliance on underlying
state law may thwart one stated goal of the UPC, to promote uniformity,
cultural shifts in recent years reflect a wide array of state recognition re-
garding nontraditional families. See supra Part III.C. Rather than the one-
size-fits-all model of the UPC's definition of the parent-child relationship,
states can rely on their own laws as being internally cohesive.
For sections 2-118 and 2-119 (governing the parent-child relationship
when the child is adopted), states that intend to adopt the 2008 UPC
Amendments should consider making two significant changes regarding
parental rights and adoption. First, legislatures should consider substitut-
ing the term "spouse" to reflect states with domestic partnerships; alterna-
tively, a state could add an exception allowing unmarried couples to dem-
onstrate consent to parenthood under a clear and convincing evidence
standard (allowing recognition of a parent-child relationship after demon-
strating that unmarried partners intended to serve as parents). If states
choose to adopt 2-118, its protection should not extend solely to married
couples, when the UPC has elsewhere promoted gender- and marriage-
neutral language.
Second under section 2-119, states should expressly allow a parent-
child relationship with the genetic parent for inheritance purposes in sec-
ond-parent adoptions.348 As written, section 2-119 states that a parent-
child relationship does not exist with the genetic parent after adoption ex-
cept in the express situations included in sections 2-119(b) through (e). 349
Because second-parent adoptions are absent from the exceptions, the child
would no longer be able to inherit from the genetic parent after adoption.
This is in direct contrast with family law in many states that recognize
both the genetic parent and the second parent as "parents" for family law
purposes. At best, section 2-119 is technically confusing; at worst, it
eliminates the right to inherit for children, in direct conflict with the
adopting parent's intent. In a state that values the decedent's intent and
perception of who are members of his or her family, the genetic parent
would be forced to write a will (and define "child" to include the adopted
child) to allow a child for which they "functioned as a parent "350 to in-
herit. 3s' Even if a state chooses not to rely on family law definitions of the
348. Currently ten states and the District of Columbia allow second parent adoption for same-sex
couples statewide: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey,
New York, Pennsylvania, Vermont; although not statewide, some jurisdictions in sixteen other states
allow second parent adoption for same-sex couples: Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, Hawai'i, Iowa,
Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island,
Texas, Washington, West Virginia. State-by-State: Second Parent Adoption Laws,
http://www.familyequality.org/resour ces/publications/secondparent withcitations.pdf.
349. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-119 (2008).
350. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-115(4) (2008).
351. Id. § 2-119.
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parent-child relationship, the state should add a second-parent adoption
exception to section 2-119.
As the final substantive amendment to the intestacy scheme, section 2-
120 proposes that a parent-child child relationship may exist for inheri-
tance purposes when a child is posthumously conceived only if there is
clear and convincing evidence that the parent consented to being a parent
and that the posthumously conceived child must be in utero within 36
months or born within 45 months after the decedent's death.352 This provi-
sion is not particularly controversial, because it effectuates the intent of
the decedent-succession law's chief policy goal. Aside from difficulty in
meeting the rigorous "clear and convincing" burden of proof, this statute
effectuates testator intent and also creates a clear and predictable rule that
is fairly easy for the public to understand and digest. Because instances of
posthumously conceived children are on the rise and state laws are scarce
concerning issues that rise from this particular type of conception, a state
legislature should consider adopting section 2-120(k) even if it chooses to
reject the remaining parent-child amendments and rely on other state laws
to define the parent-child relationship.
Finally, section 2-705 proposes revisions regarding class gift construc-
tions in wills. Although section 2-705 fails to adequately account for adult
adoptions (and whether these adoptions contradict the testator's intent), the
provisions seem to be fairly drafted, and states should strongly consider
adopting it. Further, states should carefully consider the definitions in sec-
tion 2-115, as section 2-705 relies on these definitions to define the par-
ent-child relationship. If states adequately vet the remainder of the 2008
UPC Subpart 2 changes, i.e., adding provisions for second-parent adop-
tions as necessary and relying on the UPA or applicable state law as nec-
essary to define the parent-child relationship, section 2-705 may be
adopted verbatim. Though section 2-705 is a default rule for testacy pur-
poses and should represent the intent of the majority of testators (thus ex-
cusing most from "opting out" of the default definitions), its potentially
deleterious effects are diffused by careful definition of "child" or other
class memberships.
B. What's a Lawyer to Do?
What is an estate lawyer to do when drafting a will in a state that is
considering adopting or has adopted the 2008 UPC Amendments? Most
probate laws are default laws, meaning that lawyers can draft out of those
laws by providing express language to the contrary in the will.5 In any
352. Id. § 2-120(f)(2)(C), (k).
353. See John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 1105, 1105,
1112 (2004) (stating that, similarly, default rules typically may be altered within the realm of trust
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state that has adopted the current UPC (and thus more likely to adopt the
2008 UPC Amendments), lawyers should analyze whether their clients
may fall into the "traps for the unwary" under the 2008 UPC Amendments
(particularly class gifts and devises to children). Even where the 2008
UPC Amendments have not yet been adopted, the lawyer should plan for
the contingency that the 2008 UPC Amendments will be adopted by the
client's state by drafting out of the most controversial of the 2008 UPC
Amendments.35
In particular, lawyers should define "parent," "child," "children,"
"descendant," "descendants," "heir," and "heirs" for each particular tes-
tator (paying heed to the possibility of past or future sperm/egg donations,
posthumous conception, and posthumous sperm harvesting and conception)
and should evaluate the client's (or potential client's) family structure to
determine whether drafting a will would help the client to avoid insidious
effects of the 2008 UPC Amendments. Second, the lawyer should care-
fully craft definitions of class members for class gift purposes to verify
that all of the intended recipients fall within the class (rather than relying
on the state's default definitions of the class members). Third, the lawyer
should at least consider defining devisees by name rather than relationship
to the testator when the devisee's right to take under the will may be dis-
puted."' In sum, by creative and proactive lawyering, a lawyer may re-
laws, with only a select few default rules being mandatory).
354. Lawyers should strongly consider defining the terms "parent," "child," "descendant," and
"heir"-and should specify in the definition of "child" whether to include after-born or posthumously
conceived children, define adopted children, and should consider how to define roles for purposes of
class gifts. Same-sex couples in states that have not yet recognized marriage or committed relation-
ships should have their wills reviewed and updated regularly, since divorced spouse statutes will not
prevent the partner from taking. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-802 (2005) (amended 2008)
(state statutes revoke the surviving spouse status of the divorced spouse). They also need to name the
partner or child rather than referring to a class or relationship in the will (i.e., if children are born
after the will's execution but not legally adopted-if for example no second parent adoptions-the
children need to be defined and/or listed by name in the will). For a further discussion of same-sex
estate planning concerns, see Aimee Bouchard & Kim Zadworny, Growing Old Together: Estate
Planning Concerns for the Aging Same-Sex Couple, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 713 (2008).
A simpler definition for "child" within the testator's will could be: "Child" is a person who
the testator openly held out as his or her own child and treated like a child before the child reached
eighteen years of age. Openly holding out or treating like his or her own child could include: living
with the testator or testator providing significant monetary support to the child prior to the child's
eighteen birthday. Further drafting would be necessary to include posthumously conceived children if
the testator wishes to opt out of the UPC default rule.
Moreover, the relationship of class members to take under the will should be explicitly defined
in the will, rather than relying on definitions from the underlying state law default (to prevent over-
inclusiveness or under-inclusiveness in the class as the law's definition of the class may change prior
to the testator's death).
Explicitly defining terms also helps on the chance that the testator moves to another state prior
to death-some states, for example, may refuse to recognize the designation of spouse or child from
another jurisdiction. See Bouchard & Zadworny, supra, at 723-24. Definitions of the terms will clar-
ify the testator's intent.
355. Though this approach may require more frequent monitoring or revisions to the will, it may be
the best approach for testators in stable but nontraditional families who may not be recognized by
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lieve his client from being affected at all by the 2008 UPC Amendments as
well as future amendments.356
CONCLUSION
As suggested in this Article, the law of succession seems to be experi-
encing an identity crisis. Despite its historical legacy, succession law
seems to have neither a complete descriptive theory, explaining what the
law is, nor a complete normative theory, explaining what the law should
be. Although scholars and legislatures tend to pay lip-service to succession
law's historical core goal of effectuating a decedent's testamentary intent,
this once central value has been cast to the periphery of legal relevance.
To date, scholars and legislatures have employed a bottom-up approach to
advocating, revising, and updating rules concerning succession law-
embracing a consequentialist perspective that attempts to secure a particu-
lar policy preference. Accordingly, various rules are advocated and
adopted in an ad-hoc manner with no comprehensive goal. The result is
that succession law jurisprudence has become a theoretical amalgamation
of policies. This becomes evident when analyzing the 2008 UPC Amend-
ments-the result of which seems to be overly complicated and ideologi-
cally and internally inconsistent.
In an attempt to resolve the identity crisis, this Article articulates and
defends a rich positive and normative framework for analyzing and devel-
oping succession law default rules. The Article's normative claim is that
the only goal of succession law default rules should be to effectuate testa-
tor's intent. In addition to creating this analytical framework, this Article
provides a nuanced positive description of the new 2008 UPC Amend-
ments and their implications to help provide a framework for future de-
bate.
current probate law.
356. Though it likely goes without saying, lawyers should be vigilant to verify that future Amend-
ments to the testacy and intestacy default rules are in fact rules that can be opted out of (and not man-
datory rules). If a rule such as Florida's Elective Share, for example, is adopted, it may be a manda-
tory rule that lawyers will need to entirely revise the will to accommodate. See supra Part II.A. 1 for a
discussion of mandatory rules.
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